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A LOCALIST READING OF LOCAL
IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS*
RICK SU**

The conventional account of immigration regulationsat the local
level often assumes that the "local" is simply a new battleground
in the nationalimmigration debates. This Article questions that
assumption. Foregroundingthe legal rules that organize local
governments and channel local action, this Article argues that the
local immigration "crisis" is much less a consequence of federal
immigrationpolicy than normally assumed. Rather, it can also
be understood as a familiar byproduct of localism: the legal and
cultural assumptions that shape how we structure and organize
local communities, provide and allocate local services,and define
the legal relationship of local, state, and federal governments.
From this perspective, local immigration regulations are not
unprecedentedforays by local governments into unchartedand
unfamiliar territory; instead, they reflect a natural extension of
how the incentive structure of localism channels local action.
Recognizing this not only allows us to develop a more accurate
account of the framework within which localities act with respect
to immigration, it also reveals the limitations of national or
federal-oriented immigration proposals and highlights the
possibilitiesof local legal reforms as an alternative.
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INTRODUCTION

At the Asheville City Council meeting on July 24, 2007, this
western North Carolina community faced two contentious agenda
items that drew an overflow crowd for a lively seven-hour meeting.
The first item on the agenda was illegal immigration; the second,
municipal annexation.1 With regard to the former, the city council
ultimately rejected a proposal to enter into a "memorandum of
understanding" with the federal government that would have
deputized certain local police officials as de facto immigration
enforcement agents.2 With regard to the latter, after hearing
impassioned pleas from residents of Biltmore Lake, a suburban
subdivision located on unincorporated county property just outside
the city's borders, the council decided to continue pursuing an
involuntary annexation plan that would bring parts of Biltmore Lake

1. See Hal L. Millard, A Problem That Doesn't Exist?, MOUNTAIN XPRESS
(Asheville, N.C.), Aug. 1, 2007, at 12.
2. Id. This proposal followed a much publicized billboard campaign against illegal
immigration.
See Danica Coto, Towns Consider Requiring English, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Aug. 23, 2006, at 1B; Hal L. Millard, No Mas, MOUNTAIN XPRESS (Asheville,
N.C.), July 26, 2006, at 12.
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and two other subdivisions into the city of Asheville, and thus into its
taxing jurisdiction, by the end of the year.3
At first blush, the point of this juxtaposition seems to be in the
dissimilarity of the two agenda items. Whereas the immigration
enforcement proposal appears unconventional in a city council
meeting, the equally controversial annexation plan seems
appropriately local, almost quaint, in comparison.
From this
perspective, the local foray into immigration regulation represents a
jarring deviation from local government's typical sphere of regulatory
interest and control.
But upon closer inspection, it is not entirely clear that these two
issues are distinct. When sorting through the various concernskinship and community interests,4 the standing of newcomers versus
old timers,5 the decision of who bears the tax burden for local
services6--it is actually quite difficult to determine which argument

applies to the immigration issue and which applies to the annexation
issue. With these various concerns in mind, it is not difficult to see
why the issue of illegal immigration would share a spot on the agenda

with more "local" matters like municipal annexation. Indeed, the
similarities seem to raise questions about how much of the recent
local activities targeting immigrants are really about immigration at
all.
3. Millard, supranote 1.
4. Compare id. (describing one immigrant's concern that local anti-immigrant bias is
making the city less welcoming), with id. (recounting one Biltmore Lake resident's
complaint that though "Asheville is a great city, ... it's not my home"). Interestingly,
similar arguments have been raised against Biltmore Lake residents, many of whom are
newcomers from out of state. See H. Byron Ballard, The Farm at the Bottom of the Lake,
MOUNTAIN XPRESS (Asheville, N.C.), July 18, 2007, at 9.
5. Compare Millard, supra note 1 (describing one resident's frustration with "illegal
immigrants coming here intent only on making money, with little interest in assimilating or
becoming legal residents"), with Ballard, supra note 4 (referring to Biltmore Lake
residents, who are now facing annexation, as "newcomers" and "usurpers" who overtook
this community, renamed the area, and refuse to abide by "time-honored traditions in
[this] bit of redneck America," like letting kids trick-or-treat in better parts of town).
6. Compare Hal Millard, Let My People Stay, MOUNTAIN XPRESS (Asheville, N.C.),
May 10, 2006, at 13 ("Arguments in favor of supporting illegal immigrants ... ignore the
realities of our overwhelmed social-service system, costs to our health-care delivery
system.... the exhaustion of limited resources in our public schools, and a general erosion
of our country's legal, cultural and economic foundations of success." (quoting Asheville
City Council member Carl Mumpower), with George Keller, The Other Side of the
Mountain, MOUNTAIN XPRESS (Asheville, N.C.), Sept. 5, 2007, at 9 (describing
annexation as a response to county residents living right outside of Asheville who receive
the advantages of living so close (e.g. water and sewer services) while paying half the
property tax of Asheville residents: "Some call them freeloaders; others think they're
smart").
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In recent years, there has been growing awareness of the local
impact of immigration and mounting interest in the response of local
governments!
Notwithstanding the conventional perception of
immigration as a quintessential national issue, local communities
around the country are taking the initiative on immigration matters,
especially that of illegal immigration.' Moreover, like the diverse
reactions of the different communities across the country facing these
issues, their responses have been similarly varied; whereas some
communities have endeavored to limit the local role in federal
immigration enforcement efforts, 9 others have attempted to
supplement those efforts by imposing additional sanctions, either
directly or indirectly, on the basis of alienage and legal status.1" It is
therefore no surprise that many now see these local communities as
the new battleground of contemporary immigration debates." I
But even as the "local" is increasingly invoked in the
immigration discourse, there is a continuing sense that the local
perspective is merely a narrative frame with which to recast the
familiar fault lines of the national immigration controversy. In other
words, notwithstanding the fact that these developments appear to
bring local concerns to the forefront, the conventional reading of
these events continues to maintain a solidly immigration-oriented

7. Accounts of "local" responses to immigration often refer to state and local action
interchangeably. In contrast, not only is the focus here primarily on the response of local
governments, but also state and local responses will not be treated as one and the same.
8. For an updated list of state and local activity related to immigration regulation or
enforcement, see FAIR IMMIGRATION REFORM MOVEMENT, DATABASE OF LOCAL
IMMIGRATION,
http://immigrationmovement.comllearn/immigration-reform-and-immi
grants/local-level/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2008); Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr, Laws,
Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enforcement of Immigration
Laws by State and Local Authorities, www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/
locallawlimitingjtbl_2008-04-15.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
9. See Matt Dees, Durham Won't Change Policy on Immigrants, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (West ed.) (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 21, 2007, at 1A (describing Durham's

conservative policy of checking immigrant status only in connection with a criminal
investigation and prohibiting police from looking for illegal immigrants on their own).
10. See Fred Kelly, How Many Is Too Many in a House?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Dec. 10, 2006, at 1B (describing a proposed local housing code that some believe is an
indirect attempt to target Latino immigrant households); Amy Rainey & Franco Ordonez,
Gaston: No Funds for Illegal Residents, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 11, 2006, at 1A
(describing a series of measures passed by Gaston County to target illegal immigration).
11. See, e.g., Tara Malone & Larissa Chinwah, Border Battle's Local Wars: Why
National Issue Will Continue to be Debated, Acted Upon in Communities, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Dec. 4, 2006, at 1 ("City and village halls became a battleground within the
immigration debate."); Jose Cardenas, Strong Objections Voiced Over Illegal Immigration,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at 1B ("As immigration legislation has stalled in
Congress, the battleground has shifted to city halls and state legislatures.").
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outlook. Seen as such, local efforts to address immigration are largely
considered to be illegal, undesirable, or ineffective; if not denounced
as an impermissible infringement on the federal government's broad
plenary power over immigration, 2 or condemned as manifestations of
parochial bias that frustrate national objectives, 3 they are
undermined or dismissed as vain attempts to address an issue that can
only be resolved by comprehensive legislation at the federal level.14
Nor is this immigration-oriented outlook limited to those critical of
local activism. Many who reject federal exclusivity in order to
advance a more expansive vision of local participation have done so
primarily with an eye toward federal immigration interests. 5

Considering the national importance of the immigration debate,
it makes sense that the conventional reading of local immigration
regulations privileges the national component of the equation over
the local. It is worth asking, however, whether this approach
adequately captures the whole picture. The injection of cities and

towns into the immigration debate has prompted many to ask
whether local attempts to target immigrants or regulate immigration

are in fact "local" matters. But in focusing on this question, we may
have forgotten another question just as basic: whether these actions
have that much to do with the federal immigration controversy at all.
Are we too quick to read local actions directed toward immigrants as

a subset of the national immigration controversy while ignoring the
12. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants
Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do
About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2007) ("[Tlhe plenary powers doctrine should be
applied to broadly preclude municipal [immigration] regulation.").
13. Cf. Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 377, 382-86 (2002) (discussing examples of bigotry still existing in local and
national immigration policies); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratoriesof Bigotry? Devolution of
the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553
(2001) ("[O]ne should reject a constitutional theory that endorses the creation of state and
local laboratories of bigotry against immigrants.").
14. See, e.g., Editorial, The BorderDeal, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 3,
2006, at 8A ("The trouble is that neither local nor state leaders can resolve the problem of
illegal immigration. It's a job for Congress, one that North Carolinians should be
impatient to see national leaders tackle."); McKanders, supra note 12, at 39-48.
15. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 581 (2008) (arguing that the "primary function state
and local governments play [with regard to migration management] is to facilitate the
integration of immigrants into public life"); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration
FederalismSeriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 92 (2007) (advocating local involvement
in immigration because "[i]n the administration and enforcement of immigration policy,
the federal government needs all the help it can get"); Peter J. Spiro, Learningto Live with
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630-31 (1997) (arguing that local
participation serves as a "steam-valve" for federal immigration policy).
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underlying local issues involved? Moreover, by perpetuating the
belief that federal reform, and only federal reform, can resolve the
perceived problems caused by legal and illegal immigration at the
local level, have we inadvertently limited the state and local response
to either inaction or paralysis on the one hand, and resistance to or
replication of federal enforcement efforts on the other?
This Article is a reading of the local immigration regulations with
an eye toward the legal rules that define local governments and the
institutional structure within which they act. The main problem with
the conventional account is that it doesn't take the local dimension
seriously. Here, I argue that the local immigration "crisis" is much
less the consequence of a failed or failing federal immigration policy
than normally assumed, and more a familiar byproduct of localismthe legal and cultural assumptions that shape how we structure and
organize local communities in American society, provide and allocate
local services, and define the legal relationship of local, state, and
federal governments. Federal immigration statuses, transnational
ethnicities, and the perception of immigrants as hypothetical residents
adds an immigration gloss to many traditional local controversies
over community character, demographic and economic change, and
the purpose and cost of local services such as education and crime
control. But the immigration component is oftentimes nothing more
than a convenient line-and indeed, just one among many-used to
delineate old timers from newcomers, insiders from outsiders,
neighbors from strangers. In short, this Article challenges the
traditional top-down understanding of local immigration regulations.
Instead of seeing such regulations primarily as a response to
immigration or a consequence of existing federal immigration policy,
I assert that they are products of, and complicated by, how localism
organizes and defines the powers and interests of local governments.
The trajectory of this project begins in Part I with a broad outline
of how localism informs the debate over local immigration
regulations. It then crests in Part II with a ground-up reexamination
of what this means for local communities in the State of North
Carolina. Focusing on one jurisdiction offers the advantage of seeing
how the insights offered by localism translate into tangible
observations on the ground. It allows us to examine the rise of, and
motivations behind, local immigration regulations with an eye toward
the intersection of emerging local developments with existing legal
structures. In addition, concentrating specifically on communities in
North Carolina offers certain benefits that may not be available in
other jurisdictions. It shows how local responses to immigration
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unfold in communities with little-to-no experience with this type of
demographic change. It also highlights the connection between local
concerns associated with immigrant influxes and other anxieties
produced by demographic and economic transformations unrelated to
immigration. Ultimately, this analysis suggests that the particular
legal structure of municipal and county governments in North
Carolina has an influence on not only the type of communities that
have relied on local immigration regulations, but also the type of
regulations that have emerged.
The localist reading that I present here is foremost a descriptive
reexamination of local immigration regulations. In Part III, however,
I entertain some prescriptive insights that flow from this framework.
One such insight is that we should be cognizant of the legal
constraints on local action, and the manner in which those constraints
guide local decision-making, when assessing the promise of
immigration federalism or other efforts to increase the local role in
immigration regulation or enforcement. Because localities are doubly
constrained, to truly realize such promises may require us to address
the law of localism as well as the law of federalism. The other insight
is that we should also be aware of the limitations of comprehensive
immigration reform. Though the benefits of such a reform are
multiple, from a localist perspective it is not clear that it will address
all, or even most, of the anxieties that underlie local immigration
regulations. Given these limitations, then, as Part III concludes, it is
worth considering whether focusing on reforms to local legal
structure may offer an alternative, and possibly more productive,
solution to many of the underlying issues.
I. LOCALISM AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A.

Why Localism?

Few issues in American law are considered as thoroughly
committed to the federal government as that of immigration. As a
formal matter, the principle of federal exclusivity, which ascribes to
the belief that immigration should be entirely under federal control, is
preserved by the long-established doctrine of "plenary power" in
immigration law.16 But federal exclusivity is not simply a technical
16. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 604 (1889) ("While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of
local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to
foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which

1626

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

canon of an archaic tradition. Indeed, as a political and discursive
matter, most people today still can't imagine immigration as anything
other than a national issue-one that requires the uniformity,
discretion, and expertise that only a central government can provide.
This, of course, raises an important question: if federal exclusivity is
the baseline, what purpose does a localist reading serve?
At the same time, the appeal of decentralization is also gaining
favor in the immigration context. Touting the federalist virtues of
experimentation, competition, tailored policymaking, and responsive
politics, and proceeding under the banner of immigration federalism,
scholars are increasingly employing the rich lens of federalism to
examine the complexities of immigration and the multiple interests at
play.17
Similarly, in connection with the recent move toward
decentralizing governmental functions,18 efforts to delegate
immigration-related policymaking and enforcement to state and local
governments have accelerated in recent decades as wel1 9-in part to
encourage local discretion and innovation, and in part to shift the cost
and burden of programs to states and localities that are willing, or
compelled, to support it without federal assistance.2"
These
belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance
of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory."); Rodriguez,
supra note 15, at 575-76. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984) (giving a
thorough description of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law).
17. See Clare Huntington, The ConstitutionalDimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L REV. 787, 844-49 (2008); see also Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 638 (arguing
that integration policies in one community will produce externalities that affect
surrounding communities).
18. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF
PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 63-69 (1996) (describing the trend of federal
devolution that began with the Reagan Administration); PAMELA WINSTON, WELFARE
POLICYMAKING INTHE STATES: THE DEVIL INDEVOLUTION 1-19 (2002) (analyzing the
devolution that accompanied welfare reform).
19. For example, in 1996, the federal government cut off immigrant access to many
means-tested federal benefit programs as a part of a broader effort to reform welfare.
States, however, were specifically "authorized" to provide similar benefits through the use
of state funds. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (Welfare Act), Pub. L. No. 104-193 §§ 400-451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-76 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1645 (2000)); 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2000) (authorizing states to
provide benefits to immigrants "only through the enactment of a State law after [August
22, 1996], which affirmatively provides for such eligibility"); see also Wishnie, supra note
13, at 511-18 (detailing changes to immigration policy as a result of the passage of the
PRA).
20. See WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, PATCHWORK POLICIES:
STATE ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM 3 (1999), availableat
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf ("Despite fears of a race to the bottom
with states providing as few benefits as possible, nearly every state has opted to maintain
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developments raise a similar question: with federalism as the
alternative, what need is there for localism?
These are difficult questions. They also lie at the heart of this

project. The answers, however, depend in large part on how we
define the relevance of the local in the immigration context. If
"local" is understood simply as a measure of geographic or
institutional scale, then it becomes hard to see why the prevailing
frameworks of federal exclusivity or immigration federalism cannot
accommodate a local orientation. Indeed, from this perspective, it
appears that local awareness is hardly lacking in the immigration
debates. Much has been made of the demographic, cultural, and
economic impact of immigration on local communities.2' There have
also been efforts to demonstrate how local institutions can aid federal

immigration objectives like enforcement or integration by showcasing
their resources and institutional advantage. 2 In addition, this type of
local awareness is increasingly reflected in both the national
immigration debates and their policy initiatives.23
But a local orientation that focuses on the local as a descriptive

matter is not the same as one that foregrounds the underlying legal
structure that defines and shapes what we understand to be local.

And although significant steps have been taken to draw attention to
TANF [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families] and Medicaid eligibility for immigrants
who were already in the United States when the federal welfare law passed"); see also
Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that an
attempt by New York to withhold Medicaid benefits for otherwise qualified residents
violated state and federal constitutional provisions).
21. See, e.g., Richard Sybert, Population, Immigration and Growth in California, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945 (1994) (drawing attention to the deleterious impact of
immigration on California and arguing that federal immigration policies and the
government's unwillingness to compensate the state for these impacts are to blame).
22. See Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForce Multiplier The Inherent Authority
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005)
(enforcement); Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 581 (integration).
23. The national discourse over immigration is increasingly being dominated by local
concerns such as education and public schools, crime and policing, and culture and
community character, while federally-sponsored programs are being implemented to
experiment with local participation in the areas of immigration enforcement and
integration. See section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g) (authorizing the federal government to permit designated officers in state
and local law enforcement agencies to perform immigration enforcement functions
pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding); BRIAN K. RAY, MIGRATION POL'Y
INSTITUTE, BUILDING THE NEW AMERICAN COMMUNITY INITIATIVE: NEWCOMER
INTEGRATION AND INCLUSION EXPERIENCES IN NON-TRADITIONAL GATEWAY CITIES

(2004)
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/BNACEXECSUM.pdf
(describing a federal pilot initiative, deployed in three communities, implementing a
community approach to immigrant integration).
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the relevance of the local in the immigration discourse, by failing to
emphasize local governments qua governments, or local communities
qua communities, few of these efforts have called attention to the role
that localism plays. Local impacts are represented as a consequence
of federal immigration policy without acknowledging how the legal
organization of localities influences what impacts the localities suffer
and their ability to respond. Similarly, local participation is promoted
with regard to federal immigration interests without recognizing the
legal structure within which local communities operate, and the
tendency of this structure to channel local action in certain directions
as opposed to others. The result is that the role of the local tends to
be distorted at the same time it is made relevant.
It is precisely for this reason that localism (and a localist
orientation) is necessary. In contrast to conventional approaches, the
value of localism lies in its ability to bring to light the legal structure
within which localities operate when talking about immigration. For
immigration observers, understanding this structure, especially the
way in which it constrains and empowers localities, reveals that local
involvement in immigration is much more complex than is usually
understood. Moreover, emphasizing localism in this manner allows
us to move beyond a superficial understanding of local interests and
local institutions that fail to capture the contested role of local
governments in our legal and political order. In short, if the
frameworks of federal exclusivity and immigration federalism
oversimplify local immigration regulations by representing them as
components of the broader issue of immigration, foreground localism
offers the possibility of reframing the issue of immigration altogether.
B.

What is Localism?

Of course, understanding how localism reframes the issue of
immigration requires us to first develop a working definition of what
localism is. As the Section above noted, localism refers to the legal
and structural aspects of the local dimension that are often ignored in
discussions about the "local," especially in the immigration context.
This Section expands upon that description in more detail.
Recognizing the difficulty of capturing all the nuances of localism,
whether understood as a doctrinal or conceptual framework, I
represent the following as no more than a functional overview that
hints at some of the underlying complexities.
Localism is the legal, political, and ideological structure that
organizes the institution of local governments under the state level. It
is the structure that defines the legal power and incentives of local
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institutions-from towns to counties, special districts to public
authorities.24 It is also the legal embodiment of our outlook on the
role of decentralized power in our democratic system.25
In this respect, localism can be understood as a reflection of
federalism. Where federalism focuses primarily on the federal-state
relationship, localism emphasizes the state-local relationship. Despite

this similarity, it is important to recognize that "localism arguments
are not federalism arguments.

'26

Unlike its treatment of federal and

state governments, the U.S. Constitution does not define the legal or
political role of localities. As a result, localism is at once more
constrained and more expansive than federalism. Without such a
baseline, appeals for local powers cannot rely on constitutional
principles directly. At the same time, there are few constitutional
limits on how local institutions can or should be structured.
To be sure, the jurisprudential development of localism has not
been kind to local power as a formal matter. A fundamental tenet of

localism is that localities are nothing more than "creatures of the
state. '27 Another is that localities have no power other than those
expressly delegated at the state level.28 As a result, state power

reaches into the very core of a locality's existence; as a political
subdivision, it can be created or destroyed just as easily as its
territorial or legal jurisdiction can be stripped or altered.29 Moreover,
24. For a comparison of special districts and public authorities to more "traditional"
municipal governments, see generally NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994) (detailing
the creation of many new local governments in recent years and the effect this has on local
politics); KATHRYN FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE
GOVERNMENT (1997) (assessing the benefits and costs of both general and specialized
governmental structures).
25. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1067-73 (1980) (advocating city power as a means for advancing public political
participation).
26. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits ofLocalism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 460 (2001).
27. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the State."); United States v. R. R. Co., 84 U.S.
322, 329 (1872) ("A municipal corporation like the city of Baltimore, is a representative
not only of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power. It is one of its creatures,
made for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the State.").
28. This belief is most closely associated with John Dillon's treatise on municipal
corporations and is often referred to as "Dillon's Rule." See 1 JOHN F. DILLON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 237-239 (5th ed. 1911); see
also Frug, supra note 25, at 1109-16 (describing Dillon's Rule and its dominance in
contemporary legal thought).
29. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("A municipality is
merely a department of the State, and the State may withold, grant or withdraw powers
and privileges as it sees fit."); Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79 ("The state, therefore, at its
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local power is often constrained to those that the state has seen fit to
delegate, and is always at risk of being taken away. To be sure, many
states have enacted "home rule" provisions that delegate broad
powers from the state to the local level, in part to limit the codependence of localities on the state. 30 Nevertheless, often as a
consequence of the manner in which they are written or interpreted,
most of these provisions provide localities with very little
independent authority.31
But in practice, local governments are not simply powerless
administrative bureaucracies. Imbued with the forceful sentiments of
''community," localities are often given remarkable powers and
accorded tremendous deference. For example, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly protected local control over public education, even at
the expense of perpetuating inequitable or segregated educational
opportunities.32 Similarly, the Court has long sanctioned the ability of
local governments to control for what, if anything, its lands can be
used, even if this control perpetuates the socioeconomic and racial
fragmentation of our metropolitan regions. 33 Noting that local power
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such
property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area,
unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the [municipal] corporation.").
30. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643,644-52 (1964).
31. See David J.Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2362
(2003) (noting the limitations inherent in grants of home rule powers and arguing that
"local governments do not enjoy home rule-in the simple sense of being free from state
control-as a formal matter ....Home rule in its present form ...is not local legal
autonomy"); see also DAVID J.BARRON, GERALD E. FRUG & RICK T. Su, DISPELLING
THE MYTH OF HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON 9 (2004), availableat
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/homerule/home rule.pdf
(asserting
that the mere threat of preemption discourages cities from relying on home rule
authority).
32. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (refusing to uphold an interdistrict desegregation decree in part because of the Court's refusal to treat school district
lines as "a mere administrative convenience"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-55 (1973) (upholding an educational funding structure that
produced inequitable results in part because of the need to protect local autonomy).
33. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268-71
(1977) (upholding a community's decision to maintain zoning designations that foreclosed
the construction of racially integrated low- and moderate-income housing because of the
lack of evidence supporting racially discriminatory intent rather than racially
disproportionate impact); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (finding no standing
for nonresidents to challenge a community's exclusionary zoning laws); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926) (finding the ability to zone, including
the segregation of apartment housing from other residential areas, to be a legitimate
exercise of local police powers); see also CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN
SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960: PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 204-53
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over these two fields contributes to "territorial economic and social
inequalities" by "reinforc[ing] them with political power," Professor
Briffault argues that "[m]ost local governments in this country are far
from legally powerless."' This is not to say that local governments
can resist state efforts to change their legal authority, especially when
many of these powers are specifically delegated by the state. But it
does not make this power any less real.
What the analysis above shows is that it is often unhelpful to talk
about local governments through the binary lens of power and
powerlessness."
Localities are empowered in some respects and
disempowered in others. This combination creates a localist structure
in which certain kinds of local actions are possible and encouraged,
while others are foreclosed.
Moreover, this structure of
empowerments and disempowerments produced by state (and
sometimes federal) law, which underlie the "vertical" axis of localism,
also has tremendous influence on the "horizontal" axis of localism:
the relationship between local governments and communities.
Inequitable distribution of social and economic resources, segregation
along racial and class lines, and increasing disregard for those who lie
outside the boundaries of one local community, are all consequences
of what Briffault refers to as "our localism."36 And although this
fragmentation is often accepted as a natural and inevitable
organization of our social and physical environment-a product of
economic forces or abstract local autonomy-scholars of localism
have long pointed out the strong influence of the background legal
rules that underlie both the ability and incentive for localities to act in
furtherance of this arrangement while shunning alternatives.37 As
Professor Frug argues, the structure of local power that we have
today is increasingly tailored toward a particular vision of a locality's
(2005) (reviewing the attitudes of the federal courts toward practices of segregation inside
cities).
34. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990).
35. See Barron, supranote 31, at 2334-36.
36. See generally Briffault, supra note 34 (pointing to zoning and school funding as
two areas where communities try to insulate themselves); Richard Briffault, Our Localism:
Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (considering the
differences between cities and their suburbs and taking a normative approach to analyze
social costs of "our localism").
37. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITYMAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 3 (1999) (arguing that the fragmentation of our "urban landscape is not
simply the result of individual choices about where to live or create a business. It is the
product of a multitude of governmental policies[,] ...[one being] the way[] in which the
American legal system has empowered-and failed to empower-cities.").
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"subjectivity" at the exclusion of others-one that is founded on the
idea that "boundary lines separate one [locality] from another, each
[locality] looks only within to determine its interests, and
'preservation of local interests' is a meaningful goal. '3 8 Denaturalized
in this manner, however, localism also suggests that this organization
is open to change and should not be seen as permanent, inherent, or
inescapable.
Taken together, the vertical and horizontal aspects of localism
show that many legal constructions of local power are possible, and

that each corresponds with a different conceptualization of localities
as communal or political institutions. Thus, it should come as no
surprise that the literature surrounding localism often goes beyond
the basic questions of what local governments can and cannot do, and
toward the more substantive questions of what local governments are
and how we should understand their purpose-are they public or

private, administrative or political, convenient subdivisions or bonded
communities?

Drawing from both historical39 and theoretical

40

sources, much of the study of localism has centered on how to
understand the role of local institutions, especially in an everchanging and ever-expanding world.4'
C. Applying Localism to Local ImmigrationRegulations
When this account of localism is superimposed upon local

responses to immigration, traditional frameworks of immigration
analysis such as federal exclusivity and immigration federalism are
38. Jerry Frug, DecenteringDecentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 263 (1993).
39. See Barron, supra note 31, at 2288-322 (describing the different historical
conceptualization of the proper role of municipal government underlying the Home Rule
movement); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City:
Traces of Local
Constitutionalism,147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 496-522 (1999) (contrasting different accounts
of local constitutionalism from the late nineteenth century); Frug, supra note 25, at 1080120 (exploring different historical accounts of the public and private aspects of the city);
see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638-47 (1980) (describing the
municipal corporation's historically hybrid status under the law as both public and
private).
40. Frug, supra note 25, at 1141-48 (proposing different models of envisioning the
local identity or "subjectivity"); Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community
Self-Determination: Competing JudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND.
L. J. 145, 187-99 (1977) (comparing the public choice and "public-interest" model of local
legal legitimacy); Schragger, supra note 26, at 403-16 (contrasting different accounts of
"community").
41. Like most academic fields, the new frontier of local and urban scholarship is
globalization. See generally MICHAEL PETER SMITH, TRANSNATIONAL URBANISM:
LOCATING GLOBALIZATION (2001) (describing and critiquing various theories of
globalization and urbanism).
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seemingly incapable of capturing the nuances and complexities of the
various responses. As the localism literature suggests, it is important
that we recognize the unique legal posture of local governments and
the background legal rules that constrain their conduct and define
their identity.42 Understood from this perspective, it is possible to see
local immigration regulations not simply as an attempt by localities to
extend their regulatory reach beyond local affairs, but rather a
natural extension of the many ways in which localities exercise, and
are expected to exercise, power in service of local interests.
Just as it was important to set forth a working definition of
localism, it is equally important to have a functional understanding of
local immigration regulations in order to pinpoint the specific ways in
which localism and immigration intersect with regard to these
enactments.
Accordingly, this Section is organized around a
taxonomy of local immigration regulations, which teases out the
different ways that localities have responded to immigration and their
legal and practical consequences. Along with direct regulations,
where localities are directly involved in the regulation of immigration,
this Section also highlights indirect and neutral regulations of
immigration, where localities employ aspects of federal immigration
laws in traditional local government regulations or exercise
traditional local government regulations in such a manner that the
burden falls disproportionately on immigrants. Then, for each, I
demonstrate how the various aspects of localism explored above
complicate the conventional account of local immigration regulations
and how they operate.
1. Direct Regulations and the Vertical Structure of Localism
Local regulatory responses to immigration can take a number of
different forms. Probably the most quintessential example of a local
immigration regulation today is when localities affirmatively decide to
either participate in or spurn federal immigration enforcement
efforts.43 This is especially true in light of the dominance of the issue
of illegal immigration in the contemporary immigration debates." It
is no wonder that the local regulations that openly try to address this
question are ,he ones most likely to be understood as local
immigration :.egulations. I refer to these collectively as local direct
regulations of immigration.
42. See supraPart I.B.
43. See Rodr[guez, supranote 15, at 591.
44. See infra notes 45-48.
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The days when states and localities set their own de facto
immigration policy45 and were able to deport immigrants on their
own46 are long gone. It has also been several decades since cities or

towns served as active participants in federal campaigns of immigrant
removal-campaigns that, in retrospect, were often of questionable
legal legitimacy. 47 Nevertheless, there is once again interest in the
assistance that local officials can provide to federal enforcement

efforts, along with growing concern over the impact of immigration
enforcement on the provision of local goods and services, and the
social fabric of affected communities. As a result, cities and towns

across the country have begun considering what direct role, if any,
they should assume in the federal government's immigration
enforcement efforts.48
From a legal perspective, a locality's role in our nation's

immigration enforcement regime has long been a controversial
subject. On the one hand, a vigorous debate rages over whether local

police officials even have the power to enforce federal immigration
laws,49 with some asserting that such powers should be reserved
exclusively for federal officials by nature of federal preemption. 0 On

the other hand, among those who assume local enforcement is
permitted, there is disagreement over whether fedeial immigration
laws

require

local

officials

to

cooperate

with

the

federal

45. See generally, Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
Law (177-875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (reviewing state regulation of transborder
movement of persons before federal immigration legislation in the 1870s and 1880s).
46. See BURNS, supra note 24, at 35-36; Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and
Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts,19 LAW &
HIST. REV. 583, 638-39 (2001) (detailing the case of the Massachusetts government's
deportation of several indigent resident immigrants).
47. See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRiGUEZ, DECADE OF
BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930s, at 136-51 (2006) (describing local
participation in Mexican Repatriation campaign); Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten
"Repatriation" of Personsof Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the "War on Terror," 26
PACE L. REV. 1, 4-10 (2005) (same).

48. See Huyen Pham, The ConstitutionalRight Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the FederalImmigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2006) (describing the
various local responses to federal immigration enforcement and exploring some of the
underlying considerations); supra, note 8.
49. See Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of
FederalImmigration Law, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83, 84-96 (2004); Kobach, supra note 22, at 199200.
50. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution,31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
965, 976-87 (2004); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of
ImmigrationLaws, 6 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 1084, 1091-95 (2004).
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government,"' or whether cooperation is solely at the discretion of the
local community.52 These conflicts are not isolated to the legal
academic literature. Indeed, the federal government's own positions
on these questions have been inconsistent.5 3
Congress skirted many of these issues in 1996 when it passed a
series of measures to enable and encourage more local participation
in federal enforcement efforts. The most prominent of these is
section 287(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"),
which specifically established a procedure by which state or local
governments can enter into a "memorandum of understanding"
("MOU") with the Department of Homeland Security that sets forth
the scope of their intent to assist in federal immigration efforts and
the conditions that they must follow in order to receive this federal
delegation of power.54 It may be too quick for us to assume that a
"delegation" of federal immigration enforcement powers in this
manner is constitutional.55 At the same time, its growing popularity is
worth noting. Although section 287(g) was almost entirely ignored in
the years after its passage, after the State of Florida reached an
agreement in 2002, more than forty states and localities have entered
into a MOU with the federal government. 6
Besides enabling cooperative arrangements, Congress also
imposed a series of restrictions on the ability of state and local
governments to expressly forbid any other government, agency, or
official from cooperating with the federal immigration enforcement

51. See Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous
Symbolism or Improper Dictates?,16 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 316-20 (1989).

52. See Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge:

No Federal Preemption of Ordinances

RestrictingLocal Government Cooperationwith the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 61 (1994).

53. See Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Non-preemption of the Authority of
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations
(Apr. 3, 2002) (concluding that states and localities possess inherent authority to enforce
that criminal and civil provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, reversing an
earlier opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel), available at http://www.aclu.org/
FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf; see also Huntington, supra note 17, at 801 & n.54 (describing
the controversy surrounding the Office of Legal Counsel's opinion in the federal
government); Wishnie, supra note 50, 1091-92 (assessing the differing views on inherent
state and local immigration enforcement authority).
54. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
55. Wishnie, supra note 13, at 529-30.
56. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DELEGATION OF
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT,

www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287-g.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
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authorities. 7 The clear target of these provisions were nonenforcement efforts at the local level:
so-called "sanctuary"
provisions that limited when police or other government employees
could inquire about, or act upon, legal immigrant status while serving
in their capacity as a municipal employee. 8 Unlike section 287(g),
Congress's anti-sanctuary measures faced a constitutional challenge
almost immediately after they were enacted, which the Second Circuit
heard and dismissed in City of New York v. United States.59 The court
held that the provisions in question did not compel state or local
governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory programs
in violation of the Tenth Amendment or any other constitutional
provision; they simply prohibited them from "restricting the voluntary
exchange of immigration information with" federal immigration
officials.' In the court's eyes, to hold otherwise would be to allow
state and local governments to "engage in passive resistance that
frustrates federal programs. "61
Unsurprisingly, questions of formal power dominate the
conventional analysis of direct regulations-not only the extent to
which local action is preempted by the federal government's
extensive involvement in the field of immigration regulation and
enforcement, but also the limits on the federal government's
authority to mandate local action or participation in federal
programs. Indeed, the reasoning behind section 287(g) and the antisanctuary provisions seems to lie almost entirely in their ability to
walk the fine line between these two aspects of federal power. But it
would be wrong to assume that only issues of federal power or
federalism are implicated with regard to direct regulations of
immigration at the local level, or that power and authority in this
context are easily mapped and understood.
From a localist
57. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1644
(2000)) (prohibiting state and local governments from restricting government employees
from who wish to provide immigration information to federal authorities); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208,
§ 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1373(2000)) (same).
58. For an overview of local sanctuary policies, see Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,
Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1466-74
(2006); Pham, supranote 48, 1381-95. For an ethnographic history of the roots of the local
sanctuary movement in religious activism and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee
crisis, see generally SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS
ACTIVISM AND THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993).
59. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
60. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
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perspective, formal authority is complicated by the allocation of
power between states and localities. Moreover, formal authority does
not always translate into practical authority at the local level, and the
context in which authority is exercised can have a tremendous
influence on its effectiveness. In other words, when viewed through
the vertical structure of localism-the legal relationship between
local, state, and federal governments-the line between
empowerment and disempowerment at the local level is not always so
clear.
One reason for this is that, irrespective of questions of federal
preemption or delegation, there is still no independent core of local
power. Local power only exists in legal structures defined by state
law.62 Thus, the ability of localities to engage in regulations of
immigration is always open to challenge on these grounds. The
absence of federal preemption only partially resolves the legal
legitimacy of local action, just as the presence of a federal authorizing
statute might not be enough to imbue localities with the power to act.
The legitimacy of local direct regulations, like any other local act,
must also be sanctioned by a specific delegation of state authority or
broad authorizations of power that are liberally construed by the
courts.
But this also means that federal intervention can produce
counterintuitive results. Because localities are doubly limited by state
and federal law, it means that in certain instances efforts to
undermine state and local discretion at the federal level can have the
opposite effect of actually bolstering local decision-making at the
state level. Take, for instance, the federal anti-sanctuary measures
described above, which limit the ability of state and local officials to
prohibit state and local cooperation with federal immigration
authorities.
Normally these prohibitions are understood as
limitations on local power. In situations where local and federal
interests converge, however, they appear to effectuate a radical
enlargement of local authority vis-A-vis the state. State and local
interests regarding immigration and immigration enforcement often
conflict. Thus, it is significant that both section 287(g) and the antisanctuary provisions treat states and localities as separate and
independent entities. Not only does section 287(g) specifically permit
local governments to independently negotiate and draft a MOU with

62. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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the federal government, with or without state authorization,63 but it
can be argued that the anti-sanctuary provisions empower localities
with preemptive discretion against state interference by compelling
the state to tolerate local participation in this program or cooperation
with federal immigration officials in other ways. 64
At this point it is important to recognize that we have moved
beyond the standard federal preemption analysis. And considering

the well-established subordination of localities to state power, it may
be that the legitimacy of section 287(g) and the anti-sanctuary

provisions would be more suspect under these circumstances. It is not
clear that the federal government, irrespective of its preemption
powers, can independently extend or delegate powers to localitiesmere "creatures of the state"-without any involvement by the state
themselves, much less their opposition. 65 Nor is it clear that if the

municipal non-enforcement decree in City of New York was replaced
with a state non-enforcement decree depriving local subdivisions of

the power to participate in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws 66 that the court would have reached the same conclusion. It is
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000) ("[T]he Attorney General may enter into a
written agreement with a State, or any politicalsubdivision of a State." (emphasis added));
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000) ("[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any
way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States." (emphasis added)).
64. To be sure, section 287(g) only allows cooperation "to the extent consistent with
State and local law." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000). The question, however, is whether the
anti-sanctuary provisions, which specifically void any state law that "prohibit[s], or in any
way restrict[s], [local governments] from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status of an alien," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1644, prevents states from taking any steps to restriot localities from doing just that
through a 287(g) agreement; cf Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S.
256, 267-70 (1985) (holding that federal law preempted state effort to restrict how county
spent federal funds, but noting that the federal law was based on the federal government's
power to condition receipt of federal funds).
65. See Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 135 (2004) (noting that
preempting a delegation of power authorizing only certain conduct would free a
municipality from that limitation, "but freedom is not authority, and in the absence of
some further authorizing legislation the municipality would still be powerless"). The
Court also noted a series of other paradoxes that arise when federal preemption affects
state-local power relationships. See id. at 135-38. Of course, the decision ultimately came
down to the statutory construction of a phrase, "all entities," that is more vague than the
legislature's clear intentions in the anti-sanctuary provisions. See id. at 138 ("We think it
farfetched that Congress meant § 253 to start down such a road in the absence of any
clearer signal than the phrase "ability of any entity [was meant to refer to political
subdivisions].").
66. Although not well-publicized, this appears to be the case in some states, including
Alaska. This list is constantly evolving, however. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR,
LAWS,

RESOLUTIONS

AND

POLICIES

INSTITUTED

ACROSS

THE

U.S.

LIMITING
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one thing for the federal government to usurp the relationship
between a locality and its employees, 67 but upsetting the longestablished power of states over their local subdivisions seems to raise
a stronger claim that "the structural framework of dual sovereignty"
is compromised.' Notwithstanding plenary power or the perceived
"exceptionalism" of immigration, it is not clear that courts would be
keen to allow the federal government to reconfigure the political and
power structure of states through this constitutional backdoor as a
regulation of immigration, especially when the tie to immigration is
indirect.69 Of course, all of this only further emphasizes the difference
between states and localities when they act in the realm of
immigration, and how the complexities introduced by localism are not
easily resolved through the existing debates about federal delegation
versus inherent authority in the local immigration context.
When we move from formal to practical authority, the localist
perspective reveals another set of nuances. Many commentators have
noted the unique ways that local power manifests in practice. For
example, stressing the lack of a neutral baseline for local authority,
some scholars have observed that central lawmaking that preempts
local discretion or usurps local power in the formal sense can actually
have the opposite effect in a practical sense by unshackling localities
from other legal or structural constraints.7 ° Other commentators,
noting that localities are formally separate and distinct from the
hierarchy of federal power because they are subdivisions of the state
and not the federal government, observe that even if this "formal
separation of powers maintains the locality's legal autonomy," it also
means that "local officials might have little influence over policy
when central governments do intervene or in cases in which the city

ENFORCEMENT

OF

IMMIGRATION

LAWS

BY

STATE

AND

LOCAL

AUTHORITIES,

http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/locallaw-limiting-tbl_2008-04-15.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 24, 2008).
67. But see Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976) (holding that
Congress cannot regulate the employer-employee relationship between a municipality and
its employees by establishing a minimum wage without infringing upon a state's
constitutionally-protected and independent sovereignty), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
68. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 942 (1997).
69. For an argument that the evolving jurisprudence of federalism suggest that there
is a limit to federal power over immigration, much like the limits that have been
established with regards to the federal government's use of the Commerce Clause, see
Rick Su, Notes on the Multiple Facets of Immigration Federalism, 15 TULSA J.COMP. &
INT'L L. 179, 187-91 (2008).
70. See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique ofthe New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J.
377, 383 (2001).
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would otherwise desire intervention."7 1 Taken together, these views
suggest that, from a localist perspective, the effect of assuming or
disavowing federal immigration enforcement powers at the local level
does not necessarily map easily upon the traditional federalist
framework of centralized and decentralized power.
One way these observations come into play in the context of
local immigration regulations is that, counter-intuitively, for
communities concerned about the detrimental effects of immigration
enforcement on their community, entering into enforcement MOUs
with the federal government pursuant to section 287(g) may be a
more effective tool than sanctuary provisions. This is because MOUs
offer cities and towns a seat at a table that usually excludes their
presence.
The fact is that, irrespective of whether a locality
voluntarily participates in federal enforcement activity or aggressively
resists cooperation, the local field offices of the federal government's
enforcement apparatus will continue to carry out its assigned taskpossibly in a manner that raises local concerns. To some, this
supports the argument that sanctuary and other local noncooperation
efforts should not be struck down for frustrating federal enforcement
objectives. 72 But it also suggests that, rather than disengagement,
direct participation through cooperative arrangements-or even
assuming
primary immigration
enforcement
responsibilities
altogether-might actually be a more effective tool for balancing the
needs of the community and the enforcement interests of the federal
government.7 3
Another is to recognize that local involvement in immigration
regulations is not always solely or even primarily concerned about
71. Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power
of LocalExecutives in a FederalSystem, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2563 (2006).
72. See Rodriguez, supranote 15, at 617-27.
73. For example, Miriam Wells describes how a series of federal arrests by federal
immigration officials that angered local residents of California's Salinas Valley ultimately
led to an agreement with the local INS branch that "limited INS enforcement activity in
the region to the deportation of aliens convicted of a felony," which "sharply reduced INS
raids and random apprehensions in the area."
Miriam J. Wells, The Grassroots
Reconfigurationof U.S. Immigration Policy, 38 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1308, 1327 (2004).
When an incident involving the INS in 2001 angered residents, they acted through the city
council by enacting a resolution challenging their conduct and reasserting the earlier
agreement. Id. at 1330. As a result, INS administrators relented and agreed to return to
its earlier practice. Id. at 1330-31.
To be sure, sanctuary policies are often thought to offer the symbolic value of
distancing local officials from federal officials in an effort to build trust with local
communities. It is not clear, however, whether the nuance of this message is widely
conveyed, especially when federal agents are aggressively raiding homes and employers
for immigration violators in a particular community.
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immigration per se, but in an attempt to circumvent or negotiate

obligations and constraints that have been imposed by state law.
Thus, instead of being a sign of local power with regard to
immigration, local immigration regulations may simply be a
consequence of local powerlessness in another context. For example,
many of the localities that have assumed federal immigration powers

through section 287(g) have not done so with a desire to efface the
federal-local line by enlisting with federal enforcement efforts.

Rather, the intention is often to further reinforce the federal-local
divide by trying to distinguish federal from local responsibilities in an
attempt to save on local costs over which local governments have
little control.74 In this way, they have much in common with local

sanctuary provisions.

More than symbolic resistance to federal

immigration policy, most local non-enforcement provisions are simply
calculated attempts to avoid spending local funds on immigration
enforcement, especially in a way that would make provision of other
local services as required by state law less effective or efficient in the

process. 75 Indeed, it is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the
fact that these two local responses are portrayed as polar extremes,

most local immigration policies exhibit features of76 both responsescooperation and noncooperation-simultaneously.

74. For instance, the most common MOU between local and federal authorities
involves instituting immigration screening of county jails. The underlying motivations,
however, are commonly to save on county prison costs by transferring inmates with
immigration violations to federal authorities before they serve out their full sentence, or
invoking the MOU to receive federal funds for their incarceration in county facilities. See,
e.g., Matthew DeFour, Crackdown on Illegal Spurs Debate: Federal Governments Gets
Varied Cooperationfrom State Law Enforcement Agencies, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 16, 2008, at
Al; see also infra text accompanying notes 133-56.
75. See, e.g., James Pinkerton, Police Chief Defends His Immigration Law Stance:
Hurtt S'ys HPD Won't Train to Help ICE Enforce Federal Policy, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Feb. 1, 2008, at 1A (describing Houston Police Chief's decisions not to participate in local
immigration enforcement on the basis of costs and quality of local policing services);
Karen E. Crummy, A Reluctant Enforcer City Cites Fiscal, Social Costs of Policing
Immigrants, DENVER POST, May 31, 2005, at 1A (same); see also Orde F. Kittrie,
Federalism,Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1449, 1477-78 (2006) (describing localities enacting sanctuary policies in order to
encourage trust between police and immigrant communities, and because of concerns that
local immigration enforcement is a drain on local resources); Rodriguez, supra note 15, at
604 (same).
76. For example, although New York is assumed to be the quintessential "sanctuary"
city, the executive order which now promulgates this policy prohibits sharing of
information in certain contexts, but does not prohibit cooperation in others, such as with
regard to an individual suspected of committing illegal activity unrelated to federal
immigration laws. See Exec. Order No. 41, The City of New York Office of the Mayor
(Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.friendsfw.org/Immigrant/NYC/NYCeo41_
091703.pdf. In this regard, it is quite similar to communities that have embraced 287(g)
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In short, the brief examination here shows that the binary
structure of power and powerlessness, which dominates most
conventional analyses of local immigration regulations, is inadequate
as a model for understanding the vertical structure of power from a
local perspective. The power to implement or reject immigration
enforcement efforts at the local level, and what benefits may be
derived or lost in doing so, cannot be understood apart from the
existing local legal structure that defines local incentives and channels
local action. As the next Section demonstrates, this is especially
important when we move beyond the vertical power structure of
localities and start considering how the horizontal relationship
between localities affects our understanding of local immigration
regulations.
2. Indirect Regulations and the Horizontal Framework of Localism
Direct enforcement at the local level may be the most
straightforward way for a locality to get involved with the regulation
of immigration, just as direct non-enforcement appears to be the most
basic way for a community to resist. But these are not the only ways
in which localities have sought to regulate immigration flows or
control the impact of immigration on their community. Indeed,
localities are also beginning to employ regulatory schemes that
employ statuses defined by federal immigration laws but do not
directly intersect with federal enforcement efforts. I refer to these as
indirect regulations of immigration.7"
Indirect regulations rely on federal immigration laws to mark out
the targeted group, but operate by redefining the immigrant's
relationship with the local community. This could involve delineating
programs in their county jails, but have made no other effort to incorporate immigration
enforcement into any other aspect of local governance. See, e.g., Pinkerton,supra note 75.
77. Some may argue that I have neglected another type of local engagement with
immigration: indirect benefits to immigrants. To be sure, Section I specifically addressed
instances where localities purposefully limited their cooperation with federal immigration
authorities in certain contexts, which is often interpreted as favorable to illegal
immigrants. There has also been recent controversy over policies that purportedly "give"
privileges like driver's licenses to illegal immigrants by simply not checking for citizenship
or legal status in the application process. I avoid this category for two reasons. First, like
the vast majority of communities that have neither instituted a section 287(g) plan nor
implemented a noncooperation decree, most of these cases often reflect the middle
position where a locality has not taken any regulatory stance regarding the immigration
issue. Moreover, this path is potentially endless-cities that have no explicit policies could
presumably be characterized as affirmatively giving illegal immigrants the right to use
their sidewalks, rely on police protection, patronize their stores, recreate in their parks,
etc.
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the ways in which residents and other private actors are permitted to

interact with certain groups of immigrants in the community; or it
might entail adjusting who is entitled to certain local government
services and how those services are provided. In both cases, indirect
regulations almost always invoke powers that are traditionally
allocated to localities although they rely, at least facially, on
classifications designated by federal law.7"

Though by no means the first, a pair of ordinances adopted by
the Town of Hazleton in Eastern Pennsylvania is by far the most wellknown indirect regulation effort at the local level. Not only have

these ordinances received tremendous attention since they were
passed in 2006, but they have also served as a prototype for
communities across the country. 79 Hazleton's ordinances involved

two major components.

First, Hazleton made it illegal for any

landlord to rent to illegal immigrants by requiring landlords to verify
that all tenants possessed a municipal occupancy permit, which could

only be obtained by showing evidence of legal residency or
citizenship."

Second, Hazleton adopted an ordinance that allowed

the town to suspend or revoke the license of any business that hired
illegal immigrants-in essence attaching additional penalties to
conduct that was already prohibited by federal law.8'
Legal
78. In this regard, indirect immigration regulations can be said to more closely
resemble alienage regulations in traditional immigration law, as opposed to more
conventional immigration questions such as admission and removal. To be sure, the
ability of states and localities to treat noncitizens differently from citizens, especially with
regard to economic rights and benefits, has been severely curtailed in recent decades by
the Supreme Court on equal protection and federal preemption grounds. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971). Most indirect regulations today, however, target
illegal immigrants, a subgroup of immigrants and noncitizens that has been accorded
different treatment in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
362-63 (1976) (upholding California statute that regulated the employment of illegal
immigrants in part because such regulations accorded with federal law). These policies
often have notable effects on legal residents and American citizens as well because of the
prevalence of so-called "mixed status" families. See, e.g., Kelly Brewington, Broken
Families: Tough Enforcement of Immigration Law Has the Painful Side Effect of
DeportingParentsof U.S.-Born Kids, THE SUN (Baltimore, Md.), Jan. 26, 2008, at IA.
79. See, e.g., Ray Quintanilla, Towns' Melting Pots Boil Anxiety: Influx of Hispanic
Immigrants Causes Tension for Some, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2007, at 1 (describing a
proposed local immigration regulation in Carpentersville "modeled after" Hazleton's);
Immigration Battlefronts: Farmers Branch Should Sit Out Appeals Process, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, at 20A (same for the City of Farmer's Branch); Chris
Echegaray & Yadira Caro, Cities Propose Immigration Penalties, TAMPA TRIB. (FLA.),
July 9, 2006, at I (same for the City of Avon Park).
80. Hazleton, Pa.,
Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wust.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0020.pdf.
81. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance
2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0010.pdf.
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challenges were instituted against Hazleton and other copycat
communities on federal preemption and other legal grounds
immediately after they were enacted. Thus far, the district courts that
have ruled on these claims have split on the results.82
Indirect regulations do not give localities the type of immediate
control (or sense of control) that direct enforcements offer.
Nevertheless, they proffer certain advantages that make them
popular options. First, they allow localities a means to enforce
immigration laws "on the cheap." Instead of working to expel illegal
immigrants directly, indirect regulations promote self-removal by
depriving access to valuable or necessary resources in the community.
Moreover, front-line screening responsibilities are often delegated to
private parties. Second, indirect regulations allow localities to tailor
their regulatory controls such that, instead of excluding solely on the
basis of federal immigration grounds, they can take additional local
concerns into consideration. This means that they can exclude only
those immigrants considered undesirable to the community, such as
renters or common employees. This is particularly useful when local
measures of desirability do not correspond perfectly with federal
immigration statutes. In addition, instead of relying on federal
deportation, a relatively inconvenient tool and one outside of their
immediate control, local communities can address the perceived costs
by targeting them directly. In short, through indirect regulations, a
local community need not treat all illegal immigrants in the same way
even if the federal government recognizes no distinctions-it can
effectively set its own admissions criteria, even (or especially) if they
differ from federal standards.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that indirect regulations
raise the same concerns about the vertical aspects of local power
considered above. Indeed, in both Lozano v. City of Hazleton and
Gray v. City of Valley Park, the two most recent federal cases to
consider the legality of indirect regulations, the courts were also

confronted with state claims that challenged the localities' powers to
enact such measures without specific delegations by the state. As a
whole, the courts found that the state's authorization was extensive
enough to justify the city's use of these powers to regulate

82. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-29 (M.D.Pa. 2007)
(finding the indirect regulations to be violative of state law), with Gray v. City of Valley
Park, No. 4:07-cv-00881, 2008 WL 294294 at *18-19 (E.D.Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (upholding
the validity of the local ordinance).
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Interestingly, however, both of the communities

involved were in states that have either given their localities extensive
delegations of power or have maintained a relatively strong tradition
of deferring to local action.' Thus, in states where the scope of local
power is interpreted more narrowly, it is possible that similar legal
challenges may prove to be more effective than federal preemption

for those seeking to strike down these local efforts. Not only will this
likely be true in strong "Dillon's Rule" states where all local activities
require explicit and direct authorization by the state,85 but it will also
likely prove to be useful in many "home rule" states as well,
especially those in which the delegation of "home rule" powers are

accompanied by specific prohibitions against "enact[ing] private or
civil law governing civil relationships except as an incident to an
exercise of an independent municipal power."86

83. See Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *29-30; Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d, at 548-54. The
Lozano court found the private cause of action that Hazleton's ordinance created for
employees fired from a workplace that was suspected of hiring illegal immigrants to be
contrary to state law. Id. at 551-52. This was but a small part of the overall regulatory
scheme.
84. See County of Del. v. Twp. of Middletown, 511 A.2d 811, 813 (Pa. 1986) (holding
that grants of municipal power in Pennsylvania "shall be liberally construed in favor of the
municipality" and "[i]n analyzing a home rule municipality's exercise of power, [the court]
begin[s] with the view that it is valid absent a limitation found in the Constitution, the acts
of the General Assembly, or the charter itself, and we resolve ambiguities in favor of the
municipality"). Chartered home rule cities in Missouri have extensive powers as well, but
this does not apply to so-called statutory cities, of which Valley Park seems to be one. See
Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 210-12 (Mo. 1986).
Plaintiffs in Gray only raised the municipal power issue with respect to the City of Valley
Park's licensing restriction, which the court found to be within the general licensing
powers delegated to the municipality from the state. See Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at *2930. It is not clear if higher courts will reach the same result when considering a municipal
power challenge directed at the city's landlord-tenant provisions.
85. Cf Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 691 N.W.2d 324, 328-29 (S.D. 2004) (holding that
town was not permitted to serve food in a town-owned bar because the state had
authorized the town to run a bar, but not a restaurant).
86. See, e.g., Marshall House Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 260 N.E.2d 200,
206-08 (Mass. 1970) (striking down local rent control ordinance because it violated the
"civil relationship" prohibition by regulating the landlord-tenant relationship); cf City of
Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 522 (Ga. 1995) (same with regard to local ordinance
extending employee benefits for city employees to domestic partners). Judges in other
states have reached similar interpretations with regard to local minimum wage ordinances
on the grounds that it interfered with the "civil relationship" between employers and
employees. See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825
S.2d 1098, 1108-11 (La. 2002) (Calogero, C.J., concurring in the result). Considering that
Hazleton-type ordinances are aimed primarily at these two relationships, a strong
argument can be made that home rule states with this or related prohibitions would not
allow their localities to regulate in this manner.
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Other than issues of formal power and the vertical relationship of
localities vis-A-vis the state and federal government, indirect
regulations also implicate another aspect of localism-the horizontal
relationship between localities. For those interested in immigration
federalism, the flexibility of indirect regulations raises the possibility
that their extensive use will promote the laudable goals of local
experimentation and innovation. Noting the complexities of the
immigration issue, they are cautiously championing the emergence of
indirect regulations as a means by which the promises of federalism
can be realized in the immigration context;8 7 and altering the
draconian standards of federal exclusivity and preemption in this
field, they contend, will allow us to further promote these types of
regulatory experiments on the ground. 8
There is much to be gained from this insight. Yet, it is important
that we embark on this path with a clear understanding of the
institutional constraints that are unique to localities and recognize
their effect on the manner in which localities exercise their power. In
contrast to states, localities are not only bound to responsibilities
defined by state law that are beyond their ability to disavow or
modify, but they are also embedded in institutional arrangements
with neighboring communities that greatly affect the reach of their
formal power and the internal or external consequences of their
actions. These structural constraints are not only limitations on the
powers that local governments can exercise; oftentimes they are also
constitutive determinants of the goals and desires-indeed, the very
identity-of local institutional actors. In other words, even if
expressly sanctioned, local experimentation may not necessarily
generate an inventory of innovative responses to immigration and
immigration enforcement from which policies for federal or
widespread local adoption can be selected. Rather, it may simply
produce a series of limited strategies for local advantage that are
guided primarily by established background legal rules-strategies
that may be little different than those already being employed, aside,
of course, from their reliance on immigration-related openings that
are or will be made available.
It is here that we have to recall that the vertical allocation of
power is only one component of localism. The other is the horizontal
aspect that emphasizes the relationship and competition between
local institutions, and the legal structure that establishes both the
87. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 17, at 845-46; Rodrfguez, supra note 15, at 609.
88. See Huntington, supra note 17, at 845-46; Rodrfguez, supra note 15, at 609.
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terms and objectives of that contest. Localism defines the resources
and services that are allocated in accordance with local boundaries,
and it establishes the ways in which local communities are
empowered to control who is entitled to these services and made to
pay the costs.
How a locality balances these two ultimately
determines the character of a community.
Much of the geographic organization of American society can be
attributed to the vertical and horizontal aspects of localism, and the
manner in which they mutually relate.89 Notwithstanding their
apparent novelty, most local immigration regulations mirror this
structure as well: prompted by concerns about community character,
impact on local services, and socioeconomic redistribution, they seek
no more than to exclude those deemed responsible from the arbitrary
but meaningful confines of the community's local boundaries. In
advocating for more decentralization of immigration responsibilities,
some scholars have drawn attention to the risk of one community's
conduct imposing externalities upon another. 90 Nevertheless, it is not
clear that externalities are unintended byproducts of localism that can
be avoided; at a certain level, imposing and managing externalities is
precisely how local communities are made. 91
Indeed, these were precisely the factors that were at the root of
the Hazleton ordinances. The rationale that Hazleton articulatedfinancial burden on local services, diminishing quality of life, and
nuisance 92-are not only concerns that are intimately local, but also
ones that are not necessarily or immediately related to illegal or even
foreign immigrants per se. Furthermore, although the court challenge
against Hazleton revolved around a legal question, it is worth noting
that much of the trial was dedicated to determining whether recent
demographic changes led to higher crime rates, "subject[ed] . . .
hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality
89. See generally Schragger, supra note 26; FRUG, supra note 37; Richard Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841
(1994) (describing the ways that the horizontal and vertical aspects of localism relate to
each other).
90. See Huntington, supranote 17, at 835; Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 638-40.
91. See Schragger, supra note 26, at 459 (arguing that "the definitional work of
'community' is accomplished interstitially-at the borders between places" and that "the
choice for courts and policy-makers is not between respect for the local or the force of the
universal, but between the competing force of alternative localisms"); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a DemocraticDefense of City Power, 113
HARv. L. REV. 2009, 2011 (2000) (book review) ("Community building, sadly, might be
critically related to the building of walls.").
92. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0010.pdf.
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of care, [or] contribute[d] to other burdens on public services" such as
education.93 As the district judge seemed to acknowledge, this case
was as much about foreign immigration as it was about the transition
of the old Hazleton of roughly 23,000 residents into the new
Hazleton, fifty percent larger and composed of large numbers of
"Latino families [that] moved from New York and New Jersey to
Hazleton seeking a better life, employment and affordable housing."9 4
The problem that Hazleton poses for proponents of immigration
federalism interested in local experimentation lies not in the fact that
communities like Hazleton will seek to reject immigrants on the basis
of community or local concerns as opposed to federal immigrationrelated considerations. Indeed, the purpose of promoting local
experimentation is precisely so that local concerns can be quickly
factored into the broader immigration discourse, and the
consequences of their diverse actions (i.e., steps to exclude and steps
to embrace) can be effectively assessed. The problem lies in the fact
that communities like Hazleton are not isolated entities, and both
their responses and the consequences of their responses are tied to
broader structural arrangements that make certain actions more
effective than others. Thus, certain communities may benefit from
taking specific actions, and be incentivized to do so because of the
particular significance that the current local legal structure places
upon residency and municipal boundaries. Those that look like they
are benefiting from their actions under the current local legal regime,
however, may fare quite differently if particular background rules are
changed-for example if local public goods like education, or local
receipts through property or sales taxes, were not allocated according
to municipal boundary lines. In light of this, what local activity or
local "experimentalism" may tell us about immigration policy as a
whole may be very limited. Indeed, at the most fundamental level,
they will likely be simple reflections of the legal and incentive
structure of localism and the horizontal relationship between
neighboring communities.
Of course, all of this is not to say that indirect regulations of
immigration are not, in a very real sense, local regulations of
immigration. It is to point out, however, that local regulations of
immigration cannot be easily separated from local regulations more
generally. As such, we must be cognizant of the overarching, though
93. Id.; see also Transcript of Record at vol. 1, 8-17, 23-30, Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 06-1586), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/lozanol.pdf.
94. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
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oft-ignored, influence that local background rules have in influencing
local involvement in immigration.
3. Neutral Regulations and the Internal Aspects of Localism
Thus far, we have considered local regulations that rely in some
way on federal immigration laws and the legal categories that they
establish. Local responses to immigration, however, have not been
limited to these types of regulations alone. Indeed, one of the most
common local responses to immigration does not invoke federal
immigration laws at all. I refer to these as neutral regulations of
immigration.
In contrast to other local immigration regulations, the connection
between neutral regulations and immigration is often not clear at first
blush. This is because neutral regulations ordinarily involve exercises
of power that are traditionally associated with local governments,
such as land-use zoning, quality of life ordinances, or the allocation of
local resources. Thus, on their face, neutral regulations generally do
not differ much from any number of local ordinances or policymaking
activities that localities undertake in furtherance of conventional local
interests. What distinguishes neutral regulations, however, is that
they tend to have a disproportionate effect on immigrants, and are
often enacted and enforced precisely for this reason. Indeed, even
though they do not invoke immigration or immigration laws directly,
there is usually little doubt among the parties involved with neutral
regulations that immigration and immigrant status play a significant
role. In practice, neutral regulations share much in terms of
motivations and consequences with more conventional local
immigration regulations.
Notwithstanding the roundabout nature of neutral regulations,
they represent some of the earliest attempts to address immigration at
the local level. The particular way in which the City of San Francisco
sought to enforce its laundry licensing requirements in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins9 5 against Chinese immigrants at the end of the nineteenth
century is one example. Another is the widespread use of public
health and safety regulations to either "quarantine" immigrants
within specific neighborhoods,96 or prevent their landing altogether.97

95. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
96. See HOWARD MARKEL,

QUARANTINE!: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS
AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892, at 187-89 (1997); SUSAN CRADDOCK,
CITY OF PLAGUES: DISEASE, POVERTY, AND DEVIANCE IN SAN FRANCISCO 126-36

(2000).
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Similar uses of neutral regulations are afoot today.
Local
governments all across the country have turned to housing and zoning
code provisions governing residential overcrowding to address
influxes of low-income, predominantly Hispanic immigrants who are
more likely to share housing with extended family members.98 Antiloitering and other quality of life measures have been used to remove
congregations of immigrant day-laborers in public spaces.9 9 And
although mostly symbolic, English-only ordinances have been used to
further broadcast local resistance to immigrants."° None of these
specifically target immigrants or rely on federal immigration laws.
But at the same time it is clear that these regulations concern
immigration in a very real way.
In addition, immigration is factoring into policymaking at the
local level, which constitutes another aspect of neutral regulations.
Localities are responsible for making a number of decisions that

97. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186
U.S. 380, 380 (1902).
98. Thus, communities like Farmingville on Long Island, New York, and Dana Point
in Southern California both stepped up housing code enforcement primarily in response to
the large number of Hispanic immigrants who were living in crowded housing conditions.
See DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING WHITE MINORITY:

CALIFORNIA'S ERUPTIONS

AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 56-58 (1996) (describing struggles over housing inspections in
Dana Point, California); Paul Vitello, Farmingville'sRock and Hard Place, N.Y. TIMES
(Long Island ed.), July 3, 2005, at 14LI (raids in town of Brookhaven in Farmingville).
Similarly, the City of Santa Ana in California revised local standards over what constitutes
overcrowding-a revision that would have instantly rendered more than half of the
immigrant households in the community illegal-in response to the influx of immigrants
residing in multi-family housing initially designed to attract young couples and "yuppies";
while others have considered redefining what constitutes a "family" for zoning purposes in
order to exclude immigrant households, which often contain more extended family
members than native households. See Stacy Harwood & Dowell Myers, The Dynamics of
Immigrationand Local Governancein Santa Ana: NeighborhoodActivism, Overcrowding,
and Land-Use Policy,30 POL'Y STUD. J. 70, 75-77 (2002).
99. See, e.g., ROBIN TOMA & JILL ESBENSHADE, LOS ANGELES COUNTY HUMAN
RELATIONS COMM., DAY LABORER HIRING SITES: CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES TO
COMMUNITY CONFLICT 7, 23 (2001), availableat www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/189914.pdf;

Monica W. Varsanyi, Immigration Policing Through the Backdoor: City Ordinances,the
"Right to the City," and the Exclusion of Undocumented Day Laborers, 29 URBAN
GEOGRAPHY 29, 35-36 (2008); see also Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, No. 2:08-cv-00566-ROS (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2008), available

at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload-file766_.34642.pdf

(First and

Fourteenth

Amendment complaint against local anti-solicitation ordinance directed at immigrant daylaborers); Bill Turque, Herndon to Shut Down Center for Day Laborers, WASH. POST,
Sept. 6, 2007, at 1A (describing the success of a similar legal challenge); Juan Xiloj-Itzep et
al. v. City of Agoura Hills, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting a similar
legal challenge).

100. See, e.g., Howard Witt, It's Officialb English-Only Movement Gains Traction:
HispanicLeaders Alarmed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 2006, at 4.
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affect the provision of services in that community. Although these
decisions are ordinarily mundane in substance and narrow in scope,
there are hints that more and more of them are being made with an
eye toward their effect on immigrant newcomers. For example, there
are accounts that communities have rejected bond issues to build new
schools in part because residents perceived the benefits of new
schools as going primarily to the immigrant children who represent a
larger percentage of the school-age population than the general
population."' There are also concerns that certain services are being
underfunded, or eliminated altogether, because the perception is that
they are disproportionately used by "foreigners."'"
Again, neutral regulations offer certain advantages. Like direct
regulations, neutral regulations rely primarily on municipal action,
and thus give local communities substantial control over when and
how they are used. Like indirect regulations, they can be tailored to
target activities and conduct that are not necessarily considered
relevant under federal immigration laws. Because neutral regulations
do not rely on federal immigration laws at all, however, they can go
further than regulations that target individuals purely on the basis of
their immigration status. Moreover, because they are based on
neutral criteria, many of these measures are difficult to distinguish
from local regulations that are within the purview of local
governments to adopt.
Not unlike their direct and indirect counterparts, neutral
regulations of immigration implicate both the vertical and horizontal
aspects of localism. Even though neutral regulations tend to rely on
more traditional local powers, questions about delegations of state
power and state preemption are involved, and many neutral
regulations have been struck down on these grounds." 3 Horizontal
concerns are implicated as well.
To the extent that neutral
101. Editorial, (En)forcing the Issue, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 29, 2005,
at A10.
102. For example, Maharidge notes that, in California, "[m]any people on the front
lines of government and social services now view the passage of Proposition 13," a radical
property tax-cutting measure that greatly starved California schools and placed
tremendous fiscal pressure on localities, "as a turning point in the disassociation of white
society from the growing number of 'strangers' among them." MAHARIDGE, supra note

98, at 4.
103. Indeed, there has been notable success against neutral regulations on these
grounds. See Valdez v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 05-cv-4323JSARL, 2005 WL 3454708, at
*14-16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (enjoining manner in which raids in Brookhaven were
conducted for violating state law process); Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d
486, 488-90 (1992) (holding that Santa Ana's occupancy limits were preempted by state
law).

1652

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

regulations are even more difficult to distinguish from more
traditional efforts at communal self-definition or self-determination
than indirect regulations, it is often the case that they tend to be more
concerned about the local spatial residency of immigrants in their
jurisdiction than their presence in the United States as a whole.
More importantly, the similarity between neutral regulations of
immigration and more traditional regulations illustrates the thin line
that separates what are considered local immigration regulations and
what are simply consequences of how we organize and define local
communities in American society. What is characterized by some as a
novel attempt to regulate immigration at the local level may be
understood by others as nothing more than a local effort at
community self-definition and self-determination. 1" At first, we
might feel there is a tangible difference between a community that
wishes to, for example, define itself as family-friendly by imposing
strict limitations on what kind of properties are developed and how
those developments can be used, and another community that wishes
to expel illegal immigrants or immigrant "foreigners" from its
territorial jurisdiction. Indeed, whereas the Supreme Court has
historically been quite sympathetic to local efforts to maintain a
specific community character,0 5 even going so far as to applaud local
efforts to maintain a communal refuge "where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people,"' °6 it has often raised questions about
state and local attempts to distinguish on the basis of alienage'1 or
104. See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Crowded Houses Gaining Attention in Suburbs: As
Populationof Immigrants Rise, So Do Measures to Limit Occupancy, USA TODAY, Jan.
31, 2006, at 5A (describing "anti-immigrant" raids on overcrowded single-family housing
occupied by immigrants as being prompted in part "by complaints from neighbors that
their property values are being jeopardized by multiple cars parked in front of houses,
trash, unsanitary conditions and fire hazards," and noting that some feel " '[p]eople who
are concerned about this are not necessarily motivated by racial or ethnic animus but a
sense the place is going downhill' ").
105. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269
(1977) (finding that, even though zoning decisions "bear more heavily on racial
minorities," the designation is legitimate in light of the fact that "[s]ingle-family homes
surround the 80-acre site, and the Village is undeniably committed to single-family homes
as its dominant residential land use"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 394 (1926) (upholding municipal zoning in part due to deference for attempts by
communities to preserve a certain character). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (finding no rational basis for the community's
decision to require and deny a special use permit for the building and operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded).
106. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
107. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (holding that states
lacked the power to deny or limit state welfare benefits on the basis of alienage);
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legal status. 8 But as the discussion of neutral regulations illustrates,
what appears to be an easy distinction in theory does not always
translate into one in practice.
This ambiguity does not disappear when we move away from the
category of neutral regulations. It is true that neutral regulations
stand out because they do not invoke or rely on federal immigration
laws directly; and, admittedly, it is precisely this feature that makes
neutral regulations such a convenient example with which to
challenge the traditional immigration-oriented reading of local
immigration regulations. But once this ambiguity is acknowledged in
the neutral regulation context, more traditional forms of local
immigration regulations can also be understood in the same light.
Indeed, as the earlier accounts of direct and indirect regulations have
shown, few have been enacted with federal enforcement efforts or
even national immigration interests primarily in mind. In most cases,
immigration law appears more like a tool in service of a local
objective, rather than an objective in itself. This is further supported
by the fact that at every step-the need to rely on immigration laws,
the reason for seeking a certain objective, the means by which that
objective would be served-some aspect of localism is at play.
The taxonomy above shows that local responses to immigration
can take a number of regulatory forms. It also demonstrates that
each of these forms not only involve different relationships with
federal immigration laws, but because of this, each offer certain
advantages at specific costs. Many of these nuances, however, are
hidden in conventional studies of local immigration regulation.
Neither federal exclusivity nor federalism offers a satisfactory account
of the various aspects and permutations of local immigration
regulations described above.
Parsed in this manner, it is possible to see how localism affects
traditional understanding of local immigration regulations. This Part
has used different stylized iterations of the local response to
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1948) (same with regard to
fishing licenses). But see, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927)
(upholding local ordinance forbidding noncitizens from operating pool and billiard
rooms).
108. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228-30 (1982) (forbidding states from denying free
public education to undocumented children). But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 35456 (1976) (dismissing challenge against state law regulating the employment of illegal
immigrants before federal prohibition of the same was enacted).

1654

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

immigration to illustrate different aspects of localism that are
implicated. Although I do so for demonstrative purposes, it is
important to recognize that the actual role of localism is not so
cabined. The relevance of the legal background rules that define both
the power and the identity of local institutions is pervasive. And as
the next Part demonstrates, this relevance is even more apparent
when one focuses on the specific circumstances and local legal
structure within which local immigration regulations are being
enacted in certain jurisdictions.
II. IMMIGRATION AND LOCALISM IN CONTEXT: THE COMMUNITIES
OF NORTH CAROLINA

We have now seen an initial account of how localism complicates
the conventional understanding of local immigration regulations. To
truly understand this relationship, however, it is also important to
examine the legal contexts and factual circumstances from which local
responses are emerging. This requires depth and detail that has been
lacking thus far. Local legal structures vary from state to state, and
communities around the country are facing dissimilar sets of
pressures and issues. Of course, a comprehensive survey that
examines these different permutations in all the jurisdictions that
have enacted or are considering local immigration regulations would
most likely suffer from diminishing returns.
Thus, this Part
compromises by focusing on communities in one jurisdiction-those
in the State of North Carolina.
Focusing on communities in North Carolina offers three
advantages. First, because these communities are just beginning to
see immigration as a pressing local issue, it gives us a window into the
early stages of this process when the state is still at a crucial
crossroads. Second, because immigration is but one aspect of the
monumental changes that North Carolina communities are
experiencing, it allows us to look at how immigration pressures
intersect with other transitional forces and external constraints. And
third, city and county governments in North Carolina operate under a
localist structure that varies in unique ways from those in other states.
Through this we can further explore the impact of localism by
examining how particular background legal rules influence
community-level responses to immigration.
This Section does not set out to present a definitive account of
the local response to immigration in North Carolina. Just as the
conventional federal- and immigration-oriented frameworks fail to
fully capture all the nuances and complexities of local immigration
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regulations more generally, the localist account presented here is
intended to be just one aspect of a larger picture. But seeing how a
localist orientation plays out in a state like North Carolina reinforces
the need for such an outlook in our conversation about the role of
local institutions in our immigration regime. Moreover, as the next
Part will explore in more detail, it suggests avenues apart from those
involving immigration law or doctrine that might be promising for
future consideration.
A.

A ConventionalAccount

Not long ago, few residents in the communities of North
Carolina would have considered immigration to be a local issue. This
is no longer the case. For many, the massive influx of immigrant
residents that took place in the last two decades has brought the issue
to their doorsteps. Since 1990, the foreign-born population in North
Carolina increased at a faster rate than any other state. 09 And
considering that an estimated forty percent of the state's Latino
residents, who make up the vast majority of its new foreign-born
residents, are illegal immigrants,110 it is no wonder that immigration
has become such a volatile issue in municipal and county politics.
But numbers only capture one aspect of this demographic trend.
Another is the perceptible effect this has had on the social and
physical landscape of the state's local communities. Immigrant
neighborhoods are now becoming permanent features of North
Carolina's rapidly expanding metropolitan regions, while many
communities in its rural counties are undergoing wholesale
transformations due to this influx. In Charlotte, signs of this can be
seen in the Latino-oriented shops and storefronts that have sprung up
109. The 2000 census showed that North Carolina's foreign-born population grew by
274% since 1990. NOLEN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION 2000, at 5 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf. The percentage increase of Latino residents, many of whom are
part of the immigrant influx, are even more pronounced in the state's rural counties.
About half of these counties experienced Latino population growth of more than 600%,
with some exceeding 1000%. Rebecca M. Torres et al., The South's Silent Bargain: Rural
Restructuring, Latino Labor and the Ambiguities of Migrant Experience, in LATINOS IN
THE NEW SOUTH: TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE 37, 40 (Heath A. Smith & Owen J.
Furuseth, eds., 2006). Of course, it should be noted that, although the percentage of
foreign-born residents in North Carolina increased dramatically from 1.7% in 1990 to
5.3% in 2000, it is still far less than the national percentage of 11.1% (or California's
26.2%). See MALONE, supra,at 3.
110. RAKESH KOCHHAR ET AL., THE NEW LATINO SOUTH: THE CONTEXT AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH 14 (2005), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/50.pdf.
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along Central Avenue in the city's Eastside, in large sections of South

Boulevard running southwest from the urban core, and in its North
Tryon neighborhood.111 Whereas in rural towns like Warsaw and
Siler City, the effect of immigration manifests in the ethnic revival of
once moribund downtown districts,112 and the increasing demand for
language education specialists in its local schools. The binary black-

white structure that has long defined the racial or ethnic identity of
the state is no longer adequate. With the precipitous rise of Latino
residents and an increasing number of refugees and economic
migrants from Asia,113 communities in North Carolina are taking on a
prismatic quality characteristic of more established gateway
communities." 4

Despite the cacophony of the loudest voices, the local reaction in
North Carolina resists simple classification. Vitriolic rallies such as

the one led by David Duke on the steps of town hall in Siler City1 5
are accompanied by voices of appreciation for the economic growth
and revitalization that immigration has brought to certain
communities." 6 Proactive local efforts to establish programs that
accommodate and serve the new immigrant populations" 7 are
111. See Heather A. Smith & Owen J. Furuseth, Making Real the Mythical Latino
Community

in

Charlotte, North

Carolina, in

LATINOS

IN

THE

NEW

SOUTH:

TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE,supra note 109, at 191,202-08.

112. See, e.g., Jessica Rocha & Michael Easterbrook, IllegalImmigration-Small Town,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 28, 2006, at 1A (describing the slow
revitalization of the Town of Warsaw by the influx of immigrant residents, many of whom
are illegal); Tom Steadman, Immigration: A Small Town Struggles to Cope with Change,
NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Apr. 16, 2000, at Al (same with regard to Siler City).
113. Jef Feeley, "A Better Life": Hmong, Laotianand Vietnamese FamiliesFind New
Hope in Catawaba Valley, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 16, 1994, at iv. See generally
Sawa Kurotani, The South Meets the East: Japanese Professionalsin North Carolina's
Research Triangle, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN A GLOBAL WORLD 175 (James L.

Peacock et al. ed., 2005) (describing the influx of Japanese residents to the Raleigh area);
Ajantha Subramanian, North Carolina'sIndians;ErasingRace to Make the Citizen, in THE
AMERICAN SOUTH IN A GLOBAL WORLD, supra, at 192 (discussing the rise in Indian
professionals relocating to North Carolina).
114. Cf Camille L. Zubrinsky & Lawrence Bobo, Prismatic Metropolis: Race and
Residential Segregation in the City of the Angels, 25 SOC. Sci. RES. 335, 336 ("Most major
urban centers are neither simply black or white, but rather are now prismatic: reflecting a
spectrum of colors.").
115. See Steadman, supra note 112, at 1A. It appeared that, notwithstanding the media
attention, this rally was not really that well attended. Nevertheless, other accounts suggest
that concerns about illegal immigration are swelling the ranks of hate groups like the Ku
Klux Klan. Franco Ordoqez, More Joining Hate Groups,NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 12, 2007, at 4B.
116. See Rocha & Easterbrook, supra note 112.
117. See, e.g., William A. Kandel & Emilio A. Parrado, Hispanic Population Growth
and Public School Response in Two New South Immigrant Destinations, in LATINOS IN
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tempered by the very real economic and social costs that their
presence has incurred.1 8 It is therefore no surprise then that North

Carolina is often referred to simultaneously as a model of immigrant
accommodation and immigration exclusion, 119 a paradox that Smith
and Furuseth poignantly captured when they described the shifting
terrain of the immigration debates in states like North Carolina as

"the latest version of the ever changing New South mythic that seeks
to paint the region in progressive, modern, and internationalizing
terms while at the same time holding120tight to a romanticized version
of a polemic and isolationist history.'

At first blush, the complexity of responses in North Carolina may
not be readily apparent when one considers the local regulatory

response that communities have taken. Focusing, as commentators
usually do, on specific laws or policies, one may assume that North

Carolina communities are increasingly eager to jump on the federal
enforcement bandwagon. While it is true that most immigrationrelated activity in the state has been along these lines, it is important
not to overstate the number of these policies that have actually been

adopted. As many, if not more, immigration-related proposals have
been rejected as those that have been enacted. Moreover, the vast
majority of communities in North Carolina have no policy regarding
immigration whatsoever.Y It is important to keep this in mind when
considering the more visible aspects of the local response to

immigration in the state.

THE NEW SOUTH: TRANSFORMATIONS OF PLACE, supra note 109, at 111, 126-27; Kytja
Weir, Assistance to Latinos Could Expand, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 20, 2004, at Li

(discussing the development of Latino resource centers "offering assistance with legal
issues, language skills, and navigating U.S. institutions").
118. See Steadman, supra note 112, at 1A ("It's costing us money, costing us jobs,
degrading our schools and putting a burden on the ... taxpayer.").
119. Compare Rodriguez, supra note 15, at 584-88 (discussing integration programs in
North Carolina), and Bill Ong Hing, Answering Challenges of the New Immigrant-Driven
Diversity: Considering Integration Strategies, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 861, 892-98 (2002)
(same), with Enrique G. Murillo, Jr., How Does It Feel to Be a Problem?: "Disciplining"
the Transnational Subject in the American South, in STANTON WORTHAM ET AL.,
EDUCATION IN THE NEW LATINO DIASPORA: POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

225-30 (2002) (describing the virulent response to Latino immigrants in North Carolina
communities).
120. Smith & Furuseth, supranote 111, at 191.
121. Even a generous count of the communities that have responded in some way with
regard to illegal immigration below, it appears that their numbers do not exceed twenty.
See infra notes 122-130; see supra note 8. There are 100 county and at least 550 municipal
governments in North Carolina. See P. WILLIAM TILLMAN, JR. & JENNIFER SONG,
NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POPULATION:
2006, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ demog/ munpub06.pdf.
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All three types of local immigration regulations outlined in Part I
have been enacted or proposed in North Carolina. By far the most
common and the most publicized are direct regulations involving
section 287(g) agreements. After Mecklenburg County announced
that it had identified more than 1,000 potential deportees as a result
of employing this program in its local jails, five counties-Alamance,
Gaston, Lincoln, Forsyth, Carrabus-followed suit, with even more
planning to do SO. 12 2 Thus far, these county enforcement efforts are
limited to screening the legal status of those arrested on suspicion of a
criminal offense not directly related to violations of immigration laws.
The perceived success of these county programs, however, has
spurred other localities to contemplate even more expansive
enforcement efforts.
For instance, in 2006, Charlotte briefly
considered adopting a policy of investigating the immigration status
of crime victims and witnesses rather than just criminal suspects or
123
convicts.
Like direct regulations, indirect regulations have gained support
at the county level but have yet to be adopted at the municipal level.
Two towns, Landis and Mint Hill, considered following Hazleton in
enacting an ordinance to prohibit landlords from renting to, and
businesses from hiring, illegal immigrants.124
Neither of these
measures, however, was eventually passed. This is in contrast to the
county level, where laws prohibiting any company that cannot
guarantee the legal status of its workforce from bidding on or
receiving county contracts, and denying illegal immigrants access to
any public benefits that are not specifically required by state or

122. Jefferson George, Lincoln Board Targets Illegal Immigration, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, June 21, 2007, at 1B (Lincoln County); Blair Goldstein, Sheriff to Apply for
U.S. Program,WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Nov. 27, 2007, at Al (Forsyth County). Lisa
Zagaroli, Focus on People Charged with Crimes: Dole, Sheriffs Talk Illegal Immigration,
U.S. Senator Continues Meetings with N.C. Law Enforcement, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Aug. 27, 2007, at 2B (Gaston, Cabarrus, and Alamance County); see also Eric Frazier &
Emily S. Achenbaum, Homeland Security: Sheriff Taking Skills to D.C., CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Oct. 2, 2007, at 1A (quoting Mecklenburg Sheriff Jim Pendergraph as saying

that "sheriffs in Gaston, Cabarrus, Union, and Iredell ... counties are starting [287(g)
programs] or have started similar programs"); Marcie Young, Dole, Sheriffs Discuss Illegal

Immigrants, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 21, 2007, at 1B (describing planning for
Catawba, Burke, Caldwell, and Alexander counties); Minutes of the Meeting of the
Rowan County Board of Commissioners (Sept. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.co.rowan.nc.us/GOVERNMENT/CommissionlMinutesandAgendas/tabid/447/
Default.aspx (noting the Rowan County sheriff's intent to apply for the program).
123. Franco Ordofiez, Legal Status Inquiries of Victims Not the Norm, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, May 26, 2006, at 1A.

124. Coto, supranote 2, at lB.

2008]

IMMIGRATION AND LOCALISM

1659

federal law, were adopted in Gaston and Lincoln counties to
complement their direct enforcement measures."5
More varied and less visible, neutral regulations are increasingly
being introduced in the state as well. Most famously, Charlotte
considered a "quality of life" ordinance in 1996 that would have
amended the city's housing code to lower the maximum residents
allowed in a 1,000 square-foot home, prompting some to complain
that it "targets immigrants, particularly Hispanics who live together
so they can afford rent.' ' 26 English-only ordinances have also been
passed in several cities and counties, with some specifically mandating
that no foreign language be used in any government notices or
127
publications, or in conducting any official government business.
Additionally, zoning disputes have emerged from community
opposition over the use of open space by Hispanic residents. 2 s More
interesting, however, is the extent to which the immigration discourse
is starting to influence local policymaking. Some have noted that,
increasingly, decisions about the need to issue municipal bonds for
school construction to accommodate growth have been waylaid by
discussions about "whether tougher immigration enforcement might
help reduce school needs.' 1 29 For example, in Catawba County, antiimmigrant sentiment helped fuel an anti-bond movement that led to

125. George, supra note 122, at 1B (Lincoln County); Goldstein, supra note 122, at Al
(Forsyth County). Davidson County also considered, but ultimately rejected, a similar
measure that would have compelled companies working on county projects to verify the
immigration status of their workers. Michael Hewlett, Commissionersin Davidson Say No
to Worker-Status Idea, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 14, 2007, at B1. Of course, doubts have
been raised about whether these indirect regulations, especially the extensive foreclosure
of county "benefits" and "services," can be enforced as a practical matter. See Jefferson
George, Illegal Resident Issue "Thorny," CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Apr. 8,2007, at 1L.
126. Kelly, supra note 10, at lB. See Rick Martinez, Editorial, Policies Bordering on
Chaos, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 13, 2006, at 17A. Gaston County
considered it as well; see also Jefferson George & Amy Rainey, Gaston Cuts Could Cost,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 2006, at 1B (describing county "resolution" to
"[u]pdate minimum housing requirements to limit the number of people who can live in
rental homes" as a response to illegal immigration); see also George, Illegal Resident Issue
"Thorny", supranote 125 (describing local consideration of using septic take regulations"specifically the number of residents allowed in a house based on its tank"-as a way to
address illegal immigration).
127. Coto, supra note 2, at lB.
128. See Torres v. Johnston County, No. 06-1071, 2007 WL 1745894 (N.C. Ct. App.
Jun. 19, 2007).
129. (En)forcing the Issue, supra note 101, at A10; cf Elizabeth Leland, Border Clash:
Keep Out, Say Leadersof the Councilof Conservative Citizens. We Deserve a Chance,Say
the Latino Immigrants in Morganton, CHARL017E OBSERVER, May 5, 2002, at IG
(quoting rally speech of A.J. Barker: "If they would ship all these people out that are
criminals, that are here illegally, we wouldn't have to build more schools").
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the defeat of an $80 million school construction program in 1999, only
to be followed by a protest blaming immigrants for crowded schools
13
five months later.

0

B.

A Contextual Account

Told in this manner, it is easy to see North Carolina's local
response as primarily the result of immigration. Consider the
components of the story so far: communities that have long been
outside of the migratory patterns of foreign migrants are now
inundated with immigrant residents, a large percentage of whom are
illegally present in the United States. Whether we attribute the
increasing reliance of local immigration regulations to nativism or
cultural tensions, or whether we give credence to local claims of
institutional strain and fiscal pressures, it appears that immigration
and the failure of national immigration policy is primarily to blame.
The problem with the account thus far is that, because it hews
too closely to the national discourse over immigration, it is an account
that is at once too broad and too narrow. Channeled through the lens
of the national narrative of transnational migration, it renders many
of the specific and unique circumstances afflicting North Carolina
indiscernible, or at times, irrelevant. At the same time, focusing
primarily on immigration as an isolated phenomenon, it fails to
situate this flow among other developments and recognize how they
interrelate.
A contextual understanding of immigration's impact in North
Carolina is required in order for us to fully grasp the role that the
state's particular brand of localism has played in shaping varying local
responses. To be sure, the relevant contexts are many. Here we
situate the immigration flow among three others that have also been
taking place in the state-rural-to-urban intrastate migration,
domestic interstate migration, and capital and industrial flows. From
this it is possible to see that the local anxiety over immigration,
especially illegal immigration, in North Carolina is not solely the
consequence of immigration policy or the limitations of federal
enforcement. Rather, it is part and parcel of a specific North
Carolina narrative involving broader demographic and economic
change.

130. Lucy Hood, N.C. Speaks Migrants' Language: State Tries to Keep Up with Surge
in Bilingual Needs, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1A; Greg Lacour &
Adam Bell, Immigrant FearsGrip Some Residents, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2001,
at 1V.
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Much has been made of the recent influx of migrant residents
into the state. But the arrival of immigrants in North Carolina,
especially those from Mexico and other Latin American countries,
actually began long before the precipitous increase of recent years.
Immigrant labor was already a critical aspect of the state's
agricultural sectors in the 1980s, and by the mid-1990s, North
Carolina's share of agricultural guest-workers under the federal
government's H-2A visa program exceeded that of any other state.'
"[t]hey
Their early presence, however, was largely seasonal:
appeared from distant places, stayed for weeks or months at a time,
' 132
laboring as needed, and then moved on when the work was done."
If North Carolina's experience with immigrants began with
temporary workers under the H-2A program, their permanent
settlement was spurred in large part by the transformation of the
state's economic base. 133 As cities like Charlotte evolved from largely
regional economic centers to competitive powerhouses on the
national (and increasingly international) stage, they produced an
incredible demand for skilled and semi-skilled employment which
drained workers from labor-intensive industries, many of which were
In a tight labor market with
located in rural communities.
unemployment well below the national average, employers began to
seek workers to fill the emerging employment gaps, and the
recruitment of immigrant workers became a popular option.'34 As a
result, in the rural economies, sectors as diverse as agriculture, meat
processing, manufacturing, and fishing and seafood processing
became dominated by immigrant labor.'35 In urban and suburban
areas, the exceptional growth of high-skilled residents produced

131. Sandy Smith-Nonini, Federally Sponsored Mexican Migrants in the Transnational
South, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN A GLOBAL WORLD, supra note 113, at 59.
132. Owen J. Furuseth & Heather A. Smith, From Winn-Dixie to Tiendas: The
Remaking of the New South, in LATINOS IN THE NEW SOUTH: TRANSFORMATIONS OF
PLACE, supra note 109, at 1.
133. See, e.g., Karen D. Johnson-Webb, Employer Recruitment and Hispanic Labor
Migration: North Carolina Urban Areas at the End of the Millennium, 54 PROF.
GEOGRAPHER 406, 417 (2002).
134. See Meenu Tewari, Nonlocal Forces in the Historical Evolution and Current
Transformation of North Carolina'sFurniture Industry, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN A
GLOBAL WORLD, supra note 113, at 113, 116 (describing the influx of skilled Mexican
workers into the state's furniture manufacturing sector as a result of a tight labor market
and the arrival of relatively better paying jobs).
135. See generally David C. Griffith, Rural Industrial and Mexican Immigration and
Settlement in North Carolina,in NEW DESTINATIONS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN THE

UNITED STATES 50 (Victor Zuniga & Ruben Hernandez-Leon eds. 2005).
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demand and opportunities for immigrants in service sectors such as
construction, retail and food services, and landscaping.
But immigrant workers and mobile North Carolinians were not
the only ones to heed the siren's call of employment opportunities.
Indeed, notwithstanding the attention that foreign migration has
received, it still contributed far less to the population increase of
North Carolina than another important demographic phenomenon:
domestic interstate migration. 3 6 As one newspaper colorfully put it:

"Yankees and newcomers from other Southern states account for the
bulk of North Carolina's population boom."' 37 And the statistics bear

this out. The immigrant influx in fast growing counties like Wake and
Mecklenburg-where the famed "Research Triangle Park" and the

City of Charlotte are located, respectively-accounts for less than half
of the new residents. Rather, they are eclipsed by the arrival of
transplants from distant states like New York and California, or
closer southern neighbors such as Florida.' The social and cultural

impact of this migration has not gone unnoticed; there are increasing
accounts of the tensions that have arisen as local governments
136. North Carolina's population grew by 1.4 million people from 1990 to 2000, a
21.4% growth that made it one of the ten fastest-growing states in the nation. See MARC
J. PERRY & PAUL J. MACKUN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION CHANGE AND

DISTRIBUTION: 1990 TO 2000 2 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-2.pdf (showing growth of approximately 6.6 million to 8 million).
Of that growth, approximately 315,000 were foreign-born, though many of those were
naturalized American citizens or those who came from another state. See MALONE, THE
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 2000, supra note 109, at 3, 5. Available census reports on

domestic state-to-state migration show that, during the five-year period between 1995 to
2000, North Carolina received approximately 919,000 residents from other states. See
MARC J. PERRY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE-TO-STATE MIGRATION FLOWS: 1995 TO

2000 3, 9 (Aug. 2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-8.pdf.
137. Scott Dodd, Charlotte Area Grows Torrid 29% in Decade, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Mar. 22, 2001, at 1A. To be sure, immigrants who settled first in other states
are a part of this flow as well.
138.

See MARC J. PERRY, DOMESTIC NET MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000

TO 2004:

POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS 3-4 (Apr. 2006), available at

www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p25-1135.pdf; see also KOCHHAR, supra note 110, at 5-6
(noting that the Hispanic population growth was accompanied by even larger increases
among whites and blacks in North Carolina and the South); Wesley Young, In-migrationa
Driving Force Behind Growth, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 5, 2007, at B1 (describing the
recent spike in domestic migration, which accounted for half of the Piedmont Triad's
population growth from 2005 to 2006, compared to the 24% attributed to foreign
migration). This is in sharp contrast to traditional immigrant-receiving regions, like those
surrounding the City of Los Angeles and New York, which have been losing population to
domestic out-migration, but would have lost much more without foreign immigration. See,
e.g., William H. Frey, Immigration, Domestic Migration, and Demographic Balkanization
in America: New Evidence for the 1990s, 22 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 741, 745-46
(1996).
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reorient their priorities39 to accommodate the unique demands of these
domestic newcomers.

In addition to the flow of individuals, another flow is also worth
mentioning: that of businesses and industries. Native businesses
played a significant role in North Carolina's recent economic
transformation." 4 Another large contributor, however, were those
businesses that the state was able to attract from other states and
jurisdictions.'
The ascendance of metropolitan regions like
Charlotte and Raleigh rested heavily on their success in interregional
competitions for economic development-a competition that tends to
"favor low wages, low costs, low taxes, and a decline in human and
municipal services in order to offer various subsidies for business

development."' 42 Even the rise of the state's rural economies can be
traced to a time when meat processors, textile factories, and other
light manufacturing shunned urban rustbelt locations in the Northeast
and Midwest in search of cheap labor and a more favorable business
environment in the rural landscape of North Carolina.143
139. See Ballard, supra note 4, at 9; Jonathan Tilove, Growth in the Sun: America
Moves South and West in Search of the Suburb Perfected, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.),
Feb. 22, 2004, at F1 (describing the effects of a drastic influx of migrants, mostly from the

suburbs of New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles into Holly Springs, N.C., making it
the fastest-growing town in the state).
140. For example, Bank of America, the second largest bank in terms of assets in the
United States and a critical player in growing the state's now formidable banking sector,
was a native bank that started in North Carolina and is still headquartered in Charlotte.
See Heather Smith & William Graves, Gentrificationas CorporateGrowth Strategy: The
Strange Case of Charlotte, North Carolina and the Bank of America, 27 J. OF URBAN
AFFAIRS 403, 407 (2005).
141. See Dennis A. Rondinelli & William J. Burpitt, Do Government Incentives Attract
and Retain InternationalInvestment? A Study of Foreign-OwnedFirms in North Carolina,
33 POL'Y SCI. 181, 183-85 (2000) (describing how "[t]he State of North Carolina has
developed one of the most aggressive programs in the United States for attracting and
retaining industry," partially in response to similar efforts in neighboring states, and
questioning the efficacy of state and local incentives).
142. Thaddeus Countway Guldbrandsen, Entrepreneurial Governance in the
TransnationalSouth: The Case of Durham,North Carolina,in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN
A GLOBAL WORLD, supra note 113, at 83, 91. Unlike in other states, localities in North
Carolina are not permitted to offer tax abatements. That power is reserved to the state's
General Assembly. See JONATHAN Q. MORGAN & DAVID M. LAWRENCE, COUNTY AND
MUN. GOV'T IN NORTH CAROLINA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (2007), available at

http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmg26.pdf. "In recent years, however, a number of
counties (and the cities in those counties) have developed a cash grant incentive policy
that very much resembles tax abatements." Id.; cf.Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342
N.C. 708, 712-13, 467 S.E.2d 615, 618-19 (1996).
143. LEON FINK, THE MAYA OF MORGANTON: WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE
NUEVO NEW SOUTH 12 (2003) (describing the "regional incentives" that led half of all

poultry processing plants to be concentrated in "four low-wage, anti-union states:
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina").
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The causes of these three flows-intrastate, interstate, and
capital-are intricately interwoven. It should be no surprise then that
their consequences are also mutually reinforcing. Consider how this
account relates and interacts with the local backlash against illegal
immigration. The state's population increase both contributes to and
is a result of the fabulous success that many North Carolina
communities enjoyed in attracting business and employment
opportunities. Yet, not unlike communities suffering from decline in
employment and residency, this tremendous growth puts immense
strain on existing local services and infrastructure, which often
require massive capital expenditures above and beyond the marginal
cost of adding another individual to the collective service pool.'"
When the population increase consists of low-income workers, the
ability of localities to cover the extra costs by relying on the
additional tax revenues generated from these new residents is
diminished. In addition, when the catalyst for the economic growth is
founded in large part upon the ability to attract business through low
taxes, economic incentives, and relatively cheap labor, it is difficult to
see good ways for communities to unshackle themselves from their
fiscal dilemmas. That social and cultural change is also inherently a
part of this equation-a product of all the flows described here-only
further increases the perception of the overall costs.
C. A StructuralAccount

Caught in the flow between economic development and
population increase, tasked with the responsibility of navigating their
sometimes competing demands, and left to negotiate the social and
cultural changes that they produce, it is not surprising that local
governments in North Carolina began to turn to local immigration
regulations to target those perceived to be responsible, even if their
role is only partial. But as the review of the localism literature above
suggests, 45 local legal structures also play a role; the contextual
account above would likely have appeared differently if the localist
structure defined the significance of territoriality, residency, and
municipal boundaries differently as well.146

Thus, it is worth

144. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES:
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 86-87 (1987).

THE

145. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
146. One example would be if tax revenue or local obligations did not perfectly track
local institutional borders. Another would be if local governments did not exist at all or
were present only as public authorities administered by the state. Provisions for interlocal cooperation on economic development matters, which is available in North Carolina,
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considering the degree to which legal background rules, and not
simply spatial or geographic constraints, act in concert to produce
many of these pressures. In other words, we need to examine these
pressures not simply as consequences of institutional scale (i.e.,
localities are small), but also as products of institutional design.
This Section employs the lens of localism to examine the
emergence of local immigration regulations in North Carolina. It
considers three aspects of the local legal structure in the state to
explore how, in light of the contextual reading above, local
immigration regulation can be understood as an attempt, however
limited, to manage some of the pressures that these recent economic
and demographic changes have wrought. This analysis offers an
explanation for why certain localities, namely county governments,
have been increasingly willing to turn to immigration-related
regulations. At the same time it also suggests why others, namely
municipal governments such as cities and towns, have thus far largely
refrained. I do not advance the influence of local legal structures as
the only rationale for the ways that local responses to immigration
have unfolded in North Carolina.14 7

But considering the unique

differences in county and municipal governments defined by the
localist structure of North Carolina law, it should not be lightly
dismissed. Local action does not take place in a vacuum. Here I
suggest that the specific way that North Carolina law both empowers
and disempowers its local institutions has a strong influence on
whether localities turn to immigration-related regulations.
1. Legal Allocation of Costs and Responsibilities
One reason for local immigration regulations in North Carolina,
especially at the county level, might be found in the way that the state
allocates fiscal responsibilities among state and local governments,
especially those costs that are most susceptible to the population
growth of which immigration is a part. Recall that local fiscal
concerns about immigration, especially illegal immigration, tend to
revolve around four areas: education, crime control, social services,
change the balance as well without radically disturbing the underlying structure of
localism. See MORGAN & LAWRENCE, supra note 142, at 10.
147. Admittedly, there are other reasons for the increased county role. For example,
because most of the state is still unincorporated, county governments play a much larger
role in North Carolina than many other states. In addition, because county governments
represent many of the state's rural communities, where the influx of immigrants may be
more pronounced, and whose residents may be less tolerant in their outlook, one can
argue that aggressive action directed against immigrants at the county level garners more
support than at the municipal level.
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and health care. Indeed, not only do local communities commonly
rely on these costs as justifications for local immigration regulations,
but these regulations also tend to be structured to target these areas
specifically. The local response in North Carolina is no exception. It
is also worth noting that county governments are fiscally responsible
in ways that are not shared by the state or even municipal
governments.
Consider each of these areas in turn: under North Carolina law,
education is primarily the responsibility of the state.148 Indeed, the
extent to which this system allows for statewide redistribution of
funds is reflected in the state's relatively low degree of inter-district
funding disparities.14 9 Moreover, because North Carolina relies
primarily on county school districts (as opposed to municipal school
districts), school funding suffers less urban/suburban inequities than
in other states. 5 ' But counties still bear a substantial part of the
remaining educational burden.
More importantly, counties are
overwhelmingly tasked with the responsibility of paying for capital

148. See LAURIE L. MESIBOV & INGRID M. JOHANSEN, COUNTY AND MUN. GOV'T IN
NORTH CAROLINA, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 11 (2007), available at

http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmg45.pdf (noting that the state is "responsible for
current expenses necessary to maintain the minimum nine-month [school] term," although
the county can supplement the funding).
149. See id. at 13 (noting that, "[a]lthough North Carolina's funding inequities are less
severe than those in many states," there are still many concerned about their effects); John
G. Augenblick et al., Equity and Adequacy in School Funding, 7 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 63, 73 & n.31 (1997) (finding North Carolina among seven states with high
levels of funding equity, though relatively low funding in absolute numbers).
Nevertheless, North Carolina does have an extensive history of educational funding
litigation, often founded on the idea that the state's per capita support fails to take into
account additional factors that affect costs. See generally George Lange & R. Craig Wood,
Education FinanceLitigation in North Carolina: DistinguishingLeandro, 32 J. OF EDUC.
FIN. 36 (2006).
150. The unique manner in which North Carolina organizes its school districts also
contributes to the fact that racial segregation between schools is relatively minor and is the
reason why the schools are almost always less segregated than the residential segregation
of its neighborhoods. See Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Segregation and Resegregation in
North Carolina's Public School Classrooms, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1463, 1474, 1492 (2003)
(finding "that public schools in North Carolina were, on average, not highly segregated in
comparison to other districts in the United States" and usually "offer a more integrated
experience than do the state's neighborhoods," but raising other disturbing trends and
concerns, such as within-school segregation); see also GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, NEW FACES, OLD PATTERNS?

SEGREGATION IN THE MULTIRACIAL SOUTH 13-16 (Sept. 2005) (showing some signs of
increasing school segregation in North Carolina, but still less than most Southern states).
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expenditures,"' which are costs tied most directly to population
2
growth and can be a significant proportion of county expenditures.1
Like education, counties do not bear all of the costs associated
with crime control. But whereas county sheriffs and local police
departments share the responsibility for law enforcement,'5 3 the cost
of constructing and operating local jails is the responsibility of the
county alone. County responsibility for social services and health
care is more direct. In North Carolina, not only is the non-federal
portion of means-tested federal programs like welfare and food
stamps paid for almost entirely from county coffers, but county
governments are also primarily responsible for other broad-based
general social service programs.'5 4 Moreover, although cities and
counties are both authorized to construct and operate hospitals and
health clinics,'55 most of those that are publicly built or operated are
56
financed at the county level.
It may be going too far to proclaim that the specific allocation of
responsibilities among state, county, and local governments explains
why counties have been more aggressive in pursuing anti-immigration
measures than either state or municipal governments. Nevertheless,
the circumstances from which many of the local immigration
regulations at the county level arose are certainly suggestive.
Concerns about criminality among illegal immigrants played a role in
the wide adoption of direct regulation measures at the county level.'
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408(b) (2007) ("[T]he facilities requirements for a public
education system will be met by county governments.").
152. For example, in the 2003-04 school year, county contributions to operating
expenses was approximately $2.25 billion, or 24.5% of the state total. See Mesibov &
Johansen, supra note 148, at 13. County contributions to capital expenditures, however,
were $858 million, or 93% of the total. Id. According to recent studies, these
expenditures pale in comparison to what they anticipate is needed to accommodate the
fast-growing student-age population: $9.7 billion for the next five years. Public Schools of
North Carolina, North CarolinaPublic School Facility Needs Survey, PreliminaryReport
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.schoolclearinghouse.org/otherinf/FacilityNeeds
Survey/FacilityNeedsPreliminaryReport2006.pdf.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-22 (2007).
154. See JANET MASON, COUNTY AND MUN. GOV'T IN NORTH CAROLINA, SOCIAL
SERVICES 1-4 (2007), availableat http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/ cmg42.pdf.

155. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-5 to 14.1 (2007).

156.

DAVID M. LAWRENCE, COUNTY AND MUN.

GOV'T IN NORTH CAROLINA,

OTHER SERVICES AND FUNCTIONS 4 (2007), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/

cmg/cmg50.pdf.
157. See George, supra note 122 (describing resolution that explained the need for the
Sheriff to conduct status checks because "[i]llegal immigrants increase the crime rate due
to their inability to speak or read English and understand laws"); Hannah Winkler,
Counties Differ on Immigration, TIMES-NEWS (Burlington, N.C.), Feb. 5, 2007, at Al
(quoting local concern about immigrant illegality and the fact that larger Hispanic
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But county responsibility over local jails, and the fact that jails are
one of the few, if not the only, local crime control costs that the
federal government is willing to reimburse, meant that enrolling
county jails in section 287(g) programs would also be a potential costsaving venture. 5
Similarly, though concerns about fairness and the rule of law may
have been some inspiration for counties to adopt indirect regulations
that limited the benefits that illegal immigrants can receive, they are
often inseparable from broader efforts to save money more generally.
For example, Gaston County's indirect regulation measure started
out as simply one of ten proposals in an effort to cut $5 million from
the county's $18 million projected shortfall without having to resort to
raising property taxes.'59 Indeed, the benefit-restriction proposal,
which was directed primarily at cutting costs in county social and
health services, was joined by a list of others that included
transferring county programs to faith-based organizations, asking the
state to pay for certain state-mandated school needs, and cutting
county employees. 160 Of course, the relatively paltry list of costsaving proposals, with and against which the illegal immigrationrelated measure was considered, leads us to a different aspect of the
state's localist structure.
2. The Legal Allocation of Power and Initiative
Another reason for the increasing local reliance on immigrationrelated regulations may be found in how the State of North Carolina
delegates power to its local governments, and the manner in which
state courts have interpreted that delegation. Indeed, while the state
has authorized its local governments to "engage in a wide range of

populations "made the area more attractive to drug-dealing Hispanics 'cause they can
blend in.").
158. Kristin Collins, Sheriffs Help Feds Deport Illegal Aliens, NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2007, at 1A. Alamance County Sheriff Johnson said:
[T]he [section 287(g)] program has dual benefits for Alamance County. It brings
in money because the federal government pays about $66 a night for every
immigration detainee who stays in jail. And it rids the county of illegal
immigrants, who he contends sponge public resources and are more prone to
commit crimes than legal residents.
Id.
159. Danica Coto, County Looks for $5 million in Cuts, CHARLOTTE
5, 2005, at 1L.
160. Id.

OBSERVER,

Oct.
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activities to promote local economic development,"1 61 it has thus far
given them little power to respond to the changes that such
developments might bring. What this suggests is that, for many
communities, participating in federal enforcement programs or
enacting novel immigration-related regulatory schemes may actually
be some of the few limited avenues that local governments feel they
can pursue to respond to the pressures and consequences of
demographic and economic growth.
One area where the state's legal construction of local power
affects the ability of local governments to respond to change is the
imposition of impact fees. Impact fees are typically one-time charges
levied against developers to compensate the community for the
anticipated costs that a development would impose. 62 For example,
as a condition to building a residential subdivision, a community may
wish to impose a fee for the anticipated cost that each unit would
impose on the locality for the construction of new water lines, roads,
or schools. Impact fees are not without their own problems.
Nevertheless, they have become a popular option among
communities trying to manage their expansion or reallocate the
associated costs among the parties involved.
In North Carolina, the power to define and impose impact fees
has been delegated unevenly across the state. Moreover, it has been
distributed in such a way as to leave many counties out. 63 This, of
course, is not simply the consequence of the state's political process
and its unwillingness to broadly distribute power. It is also the result
of a local legal structure that has made local governments dependent
on such delegations of power and reluctant to pursue other ways of
responding to local conditions without receiving specific state
authorization.
Indeed, the formal structure of power between localities and the
state explains much of this result with respect to impact fees. North
Carolina has not chosen to grant its cities or counties so-called "home
rule" powers, which is to say that localities are assumed to have only
the powers specifically delegated to it by the state."6 Nevertheless,
through a series of statutory delegations, powers as extensive as
161. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North CarolinaLocal GovernmentsNeed Home Rule?, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1983, 2005-06 (2006).
162. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Robert Mason Blake, Impact Fees: An
Answer to Local Governments' CapitalFunding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 417
(1981).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 174-175.
164. See Bluestein, supra note 161, at 1985-86.
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typical home rule provisions have been given to the state's local
governments.
For example, North Carolina authorizes local
governments to further broaden local goals such as the health, safety,
and welfare of its residents, and the peace and dignity of the city or
county. 65 In addition, the state passed a statute stating its intent that
delegations of power such as this one be broadly construed by the
courts. 166

But not unlike other states, the formal delegation of local power
is complicated by conflicting interpretations of its courts. It is
because of this that the issue of local power in North Carolina
remains relatively unsettled. In Homebuilder'sAss'n of Charlotte v.
City of Charlotte the state's Supreme Court appeared to have
embraced the "broad construction" statute enacted by the General
Assembly, but 167 its subsequent review and rejection of local authority
in two cases, Bowers v. City of High Point168 and Smith Chapel Baptist
Church v. City of Durham,169 suggested a return to a rule of statutory
construction that is skeptical of local initiatives taken without specific
state authorization. The North Carolina Court of Appeals attempted
a reconciliation of these two approaches in a recent case," ° but at
least one commentator believes that the issue is still far from
settled.'7 1
With this uncertainty, it is no wonder that cash-strapped
localities in North Carolina have been reluctant to explore options for
addressing their fiscal and institutional concerns. Even if there is a
chance that legal challenges will be resolved in their favor, the costs
of defending these measures, and the chance of losing in the end,
serve as strong impediments to local innovation.'72
Thus,
notwithstanding the broad delegation of power, most local
governments are likely to seek specific state authorization, which may
not be easy to get; proceed on powers already delegated, which incurs
the risk of legal challenges and inhospitable precedent; or abandon

165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a) (2007) (counties); § 160A-174(a) (cities).
166. § 153A-4 (counties); § 160A-4 (cities).
167. 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (1994).
168. 339 N.C. 413,451 S.E.2d 284 (1994).
169. 350 N.C. 805, 517 S.E.2d 874 (1999).
170. See Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 75, 606
S.E.2d 721 (2005).
171. Bluestein, supra note 161, at 2014 ("While the first part of the [the Bellsouth]
ruling provides a refreshingly honest look at the variable records of prior cases, it is
uncertain how much predictability the newly enunciated standard will provide.").
172. See BARRON ET AL., supra note 31, at 9 (noting that uncertainties over home rule
powers in Massachusetts have bred caution, permission-seeking, and inaction).
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the proposed course of action entirely.

As one commentator

explained, depending on how it is interpreted by the courts, "a legal
regime that is thought to confer a great deal of local power" can often

local governments to be
lead to the opposite result of17"encourag[ing]
3

cautious and unimaginative.
Indeed, this was precisely how the issue of impact fees unfolded
in North Carolina. In the 1980s, before the current upsurge in
development, Orange and Chatham County petitioned for and
received specific authorizing legislation from the state to levy impact
fees to pay for educational expenses. 174 Cities like Durham and
Raleigh secured enabling legislation as well to support the
construction and maintenance of roads, recreational facilities, and
open space. 75 In contrast, efforts by other counties to secure these

powers through state authorization in recent years have been
repeatedly rebuffed, in large part because of the strong real estate
lobby at the state level. 76

Durham County (not to be confused with the City of Durham)
sought to break this stalemate in 2006 by enacting a school impact fee
without specific authorization by invoking several existing and more

general state authorizations in support of its power to do

SO.

177

The

state's broad delegation of power and its generous construction
statute, however, proved insufficient. Finding that the school impact

fee was not a fee contemplated by the state when it delegated the
power to impose "fees and commissions charged by county officers
and employees for performing services or duties permitted or
required by law," 178 and rejecting the city's attempt to tie the impact
173. Id. at 2351.
174. See Act of Jun. 23, 1987, ch. 460, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 611-13 (Chatham), 616-22
(Orange).
175. See Act of Aug. 12, 1987, ch. 802, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1689-93 (Durham); Act of
Jun. 28, 1985, ch. 498, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 555-60 (Raleigh).
176. Kytja Weir & Ernest Winston, North Carolina Counties Team Up to Seek RealEstate Fee: 7 Area Counties Want Legislature to Allow 1% Levy on Sale of House,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 14,2004, at 1B ("In the mid-1980s the Democrat-controlled
legislature granted a handful of N.C. counties ... permission to pay for school growth with
impact fees or real estate transfer taxes .... More recently, though, development and real
estate lobbies have blocked the measures for other counties."); Eric Ferreri, East and West
Await Fees Decision: A Durham Lawsuit Involving Development and Schools Draws
Statewide Attention, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 4, 2006, at B1 (stating that
Durham County officials have been unable to enact impact fees due to the "powerful
lobbying efforts from developers and real estate agents who have said that the fees could
discourage potential home buyers").
177. See Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 177 N.C.App. 629, 631,
630 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2006).
178. Id. at 632, 630 S.E. 2d at 203 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-102 (2005)).
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fee to the broad authorization statute, the court of appeals struck
down the ordinance as beyond the county's power to enact.17 9
The local battle over impact fees in North Carolina illustrates
two points. First, it demonstrates the limited power of localities in the
state to manage the various pressures that growth and other types of
demographic change have brought. Second, it shows how confusion
over the construction of local power in the state limits the extent to
which localities can, or are willing to, innovate or experiment with
new regulatory tools. The lack of such options, especially when state
authorization is less forthcoming, may be another factor driving
counties to adopt local immigration regulations-relying on explicit
federal programs or federal immigration laws as their authorization.
Again, it is not clear that these measures are effective or efficient.
Yet the lack of other viable options seems to be contributing to the
popularity of these efforts in county after county.
3. The Local Allocation of Resources and its Management
A third way of understanding local immigration regulations in
North Carolina is to consider the way that state law dictates the
ability of local governments to manage their reliance on local tax
revenues.
Local governments in North Carolina rely on a broad range of
income sources, many of which are redistributed by the state
irrespective of the jurisdiction in which they are collected.18 ° As a
result, there is less reliance on property tax, the most territorialspecific source of revenue, among communities in North Carolina
relative to other states.' Nevertheless, property tax is still one of the
most important income sources for local, especially county,
governments. Moreover, it is the only broad-based revenue source
that affords local governments the discretion to raise and lower as
necessary on a year to year basis.

179. See id. at 632-33, 630 S.E. 2d at 205-06.
180. See generally DAVID M. LAWRENCE & KARA A. MILLONZI, COUNTY AND MUN.
GOV'T IN NORTH CAROLINA, REVENUES (2008), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/

pubs/cmg/cmgl308.pdf (listing various types of revenue sources, including property taxes,
sales taxes, licensing taxes, utilities service charges, impact fees, investment earnings, and
court filing fees).
181. See, e.g., Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Ranking of State-Local Revenue
and Expenditure Data: Total State-Local Property Tax per Capita and per $100 of
Personal Income, 2005, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/stlocprop.htm (last visited
Aug. 24, 2008) (ranking North Carolina 38 among states in terms of property tax collected
per capita, and 39 in terms of property tax per personal income).
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But changing the rate for property taxes is not the only way to
control that particular revenue source. A locality can try to regulate
who lives in its community or the purposes for which its land is used
on the premise that richer individuals and businesses can be expected
to pay more in property taxes than they use in local services. This
strategy seeks to increase the amount of taxes that can be collected

for the existing properties under its jurisdiction. Another strategy
would be to seek out desirable property currently outside of its

jurisdiction to add to its tax rolls through annexation. Instead of
improving the taxable potential of existing land, this strategy seeks to
add more land subject to its tax levy.

One unique aspect of North Carolina's legal structure is that
both of these options are very much open to and extensively used by

municipal governments. To be sure, it is not uncommon for localities
to have power over land use decisions, and through that, some
influence on the potential residents that it welcomes or excludes. The
ability for local communities in North Carolina to incorporate new
property, however, is distinctive. Whereas most states have made 1it2
difficult for existing cities to expand through the use of annexation,'
and easy to incorporate new cities outside of existing ones,'83 the
opposite is true in North Carolina. "Not only does the state
constitution restrict . . . [the] incorporat[ion] [of] new cities in the
proximity of existing ones, but the state's annexation statutes
facilitate the orderly expansion of the state's cities," without the need
for state authorization or even participation.18 4 In short, North

182. See Briffault, supra note 34, at 78 & n.333 ("Municipalities are generally protected
from fPrcible annexation or consolidation. It is a nearly universal rule that an
incorporated area may not be annexed without its consent and that a consolidation
requires the separate consent of each unit proposed for merger.").
183. See id. at 74 & n.311 ("In most states, general enabling legislation places municipal
incorporation in the hands of local residents or landowners .... Neighboring localities,
regional entities and residents outside of the boundaries of the territory proposed to be
incorporated generally have no role.").
184. DAVID M. LAWRENCE, COUNTY AND MUN. GOV'T IN NORTH CAROLINA,
INCORPORATION,
ABOLITION,
AND
ANNEXATION
3
(2007), available at
http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/cmg/cmg02.pdf. For example, incorporation can only be
achieved through legislation at the state level, and the state constitution specifically
requires a three-fifths majority if the community seeking to incorporate lies within a given
distance of an existing city, which is difficult if the existing city protests. Moreover, North
Carolina cities can involuntarily annex contiguous territories through local ordinance
simply by demonstrating that a number of statutory requirements-such as the "urban"
character of the annexed territory and the city's ability to provide services-are met. Id.
at 4.
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Carolina "law favors expansion of existing cities over incorporation of
185
new ones."
Thus, as cities in North Carolina have undergone radical changes
in recent years, they have been able to rely on annexation of taxable
residential and commercial property outside of their jurisdiction to
add to their revenue stream. The housing developments that would
have most likely become suburban communities in other states, and
thus fiscally distinct from the city, are more likely to be absorbed by
growing cities and added to their tax rolls. To be sure, annexation is
not without controversy in North Carolina. Moreover, the power can
be abused: many rural communities have used their annexation
powers to selectively expand, excluding minority-populated areas just
outside the city boundaries and thus denying them access to basic
municipal goods and services. 186 Nevertheless, annexation is an
important power that localities possess to manage growth and
respond to shifting land use patterns.
Considering the extent to which urban/suburban divisions have
plagued regional politics in most states, it could be possible that
preferring annexation over the incorporation of new communities has
helped contain some anti-immigration backlashes by reducing the
intense competition that typically characterizes the relationship
between neighboring communities. For municipal governments in
North Carolina, the pressure to compete for residents or exclude
others may be less pronounced because territorial boundaries matter
that much less as a result. Indeed, this pressure may be further
lessened by the fact that other sources of revenue like sales and use
taxes are distributed in part on a per capita basis irrespective of where
they are collected, and traditional local expenditures like education
are primarily the responsibility of the state and county governments.
Counties, however, lack the ability to annex. Unlike municipal
governments in North Carolina, they collectively subdivide the entire
territorial jurisdiction of the state and thus have neither the ability to
185. Id. at 3.
186. See generally James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., Racial Apartheid in a Small North
Carolina Town, 31 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 89 (2004) (describing how discriminatory
zoning tactics can be used to deny African Americans access to basic services). The
segregation is made worse by the fact that the municipal governments in North Carolina
have "Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction" over the land-use of the minority neighborhoods
outside of its official borders. Id. at 95; see also CEDAR GROVE INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES,
INCORPORATION,
ANNEXATION,
AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: A DOUBLE STANDARD?: PREDOMINANTLY-MINORITY

TOWNS STRUGGLE (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.mcmoss.org/CedarGrove/
Docs/anns10 24.pdf.
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expand or shrink. Moreover, county governments have a heavier
reliance on property taxes than municipal governments in part
because municipal governments operate utilities, which generate a
substantial amount of income."8 Thus, county boundaries is of
greater significance, and control over potential residents, rather than
county territorial jurisdictions, are much more important to counties
seeking to manage their costs and resources at a time of growth.
Again, it may be a stretch to argue that this particular difference
explains why counties have been more aggressive than cities in
seeking to deflect the residency of illegal immigrants. At the same
time, regulatory patterns usually associated with inter-municipal
conflict in other states without broad annexation rules are beginning
to appear in the inter-county politics over illegal immigration. This is
especially true for counties that are becoming oriented around an
expanding metropolitan core. Consider, for example, the fact that all
but one of the counties surrounding Mecklenburg County (where
Charlotte is located)-Gaston, Lincoln, Carrabus, Catawaba, Union,
and Rowan-are involved in the section 287(g) program or have
enacted more extensive illegal immigration measures.18 8 Indeed, as
the commissioner for Lincoln County offered as explanation: illegal
immigrants "move from area to area to avoid" communities that have
enacted local regulations, and because Mecklenburg and Gaston had
already done so, Lincoln needed to follow suit or risk "a lot of illegals
89
...spill[ing] over into Lincoln County to get away from that."'

Told from this perspective, it is possible to see the emergence of
local immigration regulations in North Carolina as being independent
of immigration or federal immigration policy. If we credit the
rationales put forward for their adoption, then local immigration
regulations appear to be foremost an attempt to manage and
negotiate the fiscal and cultural pressures faced by a certain number
of the state's local institutions. "Illegal immigrants" in this context
serve as a proxy for these anxieties and not, as it is usually
understood, the other way around. Indeed, these pressures do not
appear to be primarily, much less entirely, the result of illegal
immigration. Rather, broader economic and demographic changes
appear to be playing an even larger role, and the pressures certain

187. See LAWRENCE & MILLONZI, supra note 180, at 2.
188. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
189. George, supra note 122.

1676

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

localities are facing seem to be largely the result of the state's local
legal structure. Thus, more than a product of immigration, or a
consequence of federalism, local immigration regulations in North
Carolina can be said to be principally a byproduct of localism.
It is not my intention to efface the specter of immigration
entirely from this reading. Nor do I believe that this is possible. It
cannot be denied that, for many residents in North Carolina, illegal
immigration is the frame through which they understand the changes
currently taking place in the state."9 It would be equally remiss to
ignore the fact that local leaders who are currently involved with
immigration regulations regularly invoke illegal immigration as the
root of their communities' ills.19 But the tendency for communities
to associate a particular population in their community with its
perceived problems, and the impetus for them to seek territorial
exclusion or further political marginalization as the solution, is as
much a consequence of the incentive structure built into how we
organize local communities as it is about individual bias or resistance
to change. 9 2 If individual preferences cannot be understood apart
from the communities and societies in which individuals are
embedded, then it makes sense that local legal structures do not
simply affect what preferences can be actualized through local action,
but often act to define those preferences in the first instance.
The critical point is that the seemingly natural baseline upon
which local communities and their residents are crafting their
response is itself the product of a legal structure that can be reformed.
Thus, to the extent the backlash against illegal immigration is a
consequence of the incentive structure that motivates certain
communities to act and not others, it can be argued that addressing
localist structures might be an effective alternative. Indeed, the
account of local immigration regulations in North Carolina is as much
a story about how various factors may have led some localities to
respond with enforcement measures, while leading others to react in

190. See Steadman, supra note 112 (recounting local descriptions of recent changes told
primarily through the lens of immigration).
191. See George, supra note 122 (noting that Lincoln and Gaston Counties' illegal
immigration regulations both include "language blaming illegal immigrants for economic
burdens and social ills"); see also Coto, supra note 2 (quoting illegal immigration proposal
in Mint Hill that states, among other things, that "illegal immigration ... destroys our
neighborhoods").
192. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849-57 (1994) (modeling how local legal
structures perpetuate or exacerbate racial segregation even in the absence of racism).

2008]

IMMIGRATION AND LOCALISM

1677

other, sometimes non-immigration-related, ways. The next Part will
consider these arguments in more detail.
III. NOTES TOWARD IMMIGRATION LOCALISM

Localism both complicates and enhances our understanding of
local immigration regulations. We have seen this unfold in two
distinct but interrelated contexts-as a matter of theory and as
applied to a specific jurisdiction. The consideration that remains is
what consequences, if any, this has on how one should approach local
immigration regulations as a matter of policy. Relying on the insights
that localism provides, this Section highlights the limitations of two
prevailing reform perspectives and suggests a third-local legal
reform-as a possible counterpart to these efforts.
A.

The Limits of Local Participation

First, for those concerned about or interested in local
involvement in immigration, it is important to recognize the ways in
which localism both constrains and channels local action.
Recall that most of the debates regarding the role of local
institutions in the immigration context revolve around interpretations
of federal preemption. On the one hand, those concerned about local
discretion have argued strongly in favor of invoking federal
exclusivity to preempt local involvement, which is motivated by
concerns about local participation in federal enforcement efforts 93 as
much as local resistance to these efforts. 9 4 On the other hand, fearful
that a strict interpretation of federal exclusivity would foreclose too
much, others are arguing that local immigration-related activity
should be analyzed through the more conventional doctrine of
federalism.19 This does not mean that all local action would be
permitted, but it does suggest that substantive examinations, and not
categorical analysis, would be employed in such a way that the
federalist benefits of decentralization can be realized. 96
This is an important debate with wide-ranging consequences for
immigration law. What localism suggests, however, is that if we take
localism seriously, this debate between federal exclusivity and
193. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 50, at 1102-15 (expressing concern about racial
profiling and other abuses that local enforcement of immigration laws promotes).
194. See, e.g., Carro, supra note 51, at 316-20 (arguing that prohibiting states and
localities from cooperating with federal immigration officials frustrates federal
immigration enforcement efforts).
195. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
196. See Huntington, supra note 17, at 833.
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immigration federalism may only be of marginal significance, and
probably only in the most extreme cases. Irrespective of whether
localities are prohibited from acting with regard to immigration, the
type of action that localities will take will likely be influenced more by
the local legal structure within which they operate than any other
legal or doctrinal framework. For example, assuming that a workable
line can be drawn between regulations of immigration and exercises
of local police powers, there is no guarantee that federal preemption
will foreclose all, or even a significant number, of local regulations
that target immigrant residents. Conversely, assuming that some
niche can be carved out for local participation, there is no assurance
that the experimentation will not simply reflect the way in which
localism structures local incentives, rather than a true reflection of
local interests or local potential.
The fact is that most local involvement in immigration will likely
be superficially related to immigration. In most instances, they will
only be attempts to negotiate local interests upon an established
structure of legal background rules in which invoking "immigration"
proves to be useful. In times when federal interests in enforcement or
integration converge with local interests, local action may be helpful.
Yet relying on this convergence will not likely produce the long term
stability that both federal enforcement and integration efforts
require. It is important to remember that localities are neither
passive administrators nor autonomous entities. The fact that they
are neither complicates expectations about how they will behavewith or without the risk of federal preemption or the imprimatur of
federal sanction. As the last Section here demonstrates, however, this
does not mean that those concerned about or interested in local
participation cannot pursue a different, non-federal-oriented route.
B.

The Limits of ComprehensiveFederalReform

Second, for those concerned about local immigration regulations
from the perspective of the localities involved, it is important to
recognize the limitations of federal intervention in the form of
comprehensive immigration reform.
The localist reading here
suggests that, while such reform is necessary for many reasons, we
should recognize the limited potential that it has for addressing many
of the concerns that underlie local immigration regulations.
Accordingly, state and local leaders should reconsider their
assumption that federal reform is the best, or only, long-term solution
to the so-called local immigration crisis.
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Admittedly, this is not a widely-held view. The conventional
account of the relationship between local immigration regulations and
comprehensive immigration reform is that the former is caused by the
absence of the latter. 197 It assumes that local immigration regulations
are but imperfect substitutes for more comprehensive federal action
on the matter, and that federal action will negate the need for the
local response. As a result, it is widely believed that the controversy
over local immigration regulations can only be resolved by enacting
comprehensive immigration reform.198
Again, there are strong arguments in favor of reforming our
immigration laws, possibly in a comprehensive manner. What
localism suggests, however, is that such a reform will likely only be
able to address the symptoms of local immigration regulations, and
not the cause of the underlying illness. This Article has attempted to
illustrate the multiple reasons that localities turn to local immigration
regulations, many of which have little to do with immigration or
federal immigration policy per se, or which are related in only a
tangential manner.
Therefore, assuming that an immigration
compromise can be reached, it is important to recognize what
localities can expect from federal action. In other words, from an
immigration-oriented perspective, critics may be right to argue that,
"[tihe county-by-county approach [to immigration] just isn't working
out."'199 But it does not necessarily mean that a federal approach to
the immigration issue will be more successful in addressing many of
the underlying local concerns at play.
Consider, for example, reforms that either legalize the status of
those illegally present or provide more opportunities for immigrants
to come to, or work in, the United States. To be sure, this may
succeed in eliminating the legal foundation for many local
immigration regulations. But it would likely have minimal effect on
197. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 126 ("While Congress continues to turn its back on
immigration control and reform, local governments are taking matters into their own
hands."); Coto, supra note 2 ("As national immigration reform takes a back seat to
conflict in the Middle East, a couple of N.C. towns are picking up where Congress left
off.").
198. See, e.g., Stella M. Hopkins, N.C., S.C. Targeting Illegal Workers, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, May 13, 2006, at IA (paraphrasing remark from Michele Waslin, director of
immigration policy research for the National Council of La Raza: "But states can't solve a
national problem piecemeal. Immigration is a federal issue, and Congress needs to act, in
part to provide illegal immigrants already here with a path to citizenship."); Editorial,
Toothless Talk, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Nov. 30, 2005, at 16A ("What's needed is for
Congress to enact consistent, realistic immigration policy and fund it adequately ....
Those are the steps that Mecklenburg County's commissioners should be demanding.").
199. Martinez, supra note 126.
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the local concerns that prompted many of those laws to be passed.
Not only would the fiscal pressures remain, 00 but so would the basis
for the cultural tensions.
Moreover, considering that local
immigration regulations have historically relied on immigration laws
just as easily as more traditional local regulatory measures, it can be
expected that any reform that eliminates the salience of illegal status
would only have a partial effect on the enactment of local
immigration regulations, even if they were to arise in a different
201
form.
It is also doubtful that taking a contrary approach to
comprehensive reform-one that emphasizes enforcement above all
else-would produce results that are all that different for the local
communities involved.
In a tight labor market like North
Carolina's, 2 2 the elimination of all illegal workers would either drive
businesses or industries out of a particular jurisdiction (or out of
business entirely), or lead to illegal workers being replaced by
similarly-situated legal or native employees. With respect to the
former, relocations or closures would likely produce substantial costs
and a host of other problems that rival those associated with the
influx of illegal immigrant workers. With regard to the latter, as long
as the industry continues to recruit low-paid employees of prime
working, and thus child-bearing age, while providing little to no
benefits, it is likely that the local fiscal strain would not only be just as
high, but actually higher because of their eligibility for benefits and
social services that are not available to illegal residents. It can be
argued that the cultural difference may be less noticeable, though I
suspect that similar concerns will still arise in many communities with
regard to a surge of legal or native workers from other states or
regions. It can also be argued that legal and native workers would
200. For those currently illegal, mass legalization could translate into higher wages. It
could also move them into other, more profitable, sectors as it did in 1986. See Francisco
L. Rivera-Batiz, Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An Analysis of the
Earningsof Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrantsin the United States, 12 J. POPULATION
ECON. 96 (1999). This may ultimately benefit localities through increased property and
sales taxes, and indirectly through state payroll taxes. But I suspect that much of the
underlying economic tensions between the goals of locality, residents, and employers
(outlined above) would still remain unresolved.
201. Cf Ford, supranote 192 (describing how local government rules perpetuate racial
segregation and disadvantage racial minorities even in a post-racial world, politically or
socially.).
202. This is especially true in low-skilled industries that employ immigrant labor. See,
e.g., Rachel A. Willis, Voices of Southern Mill Workers: Responses to Border Crossers in
American Factoriesand Jobs CrossingBorders, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN A GLOBAL
WORLD, supranote 113, at 138, 142-43; Tewari, supra note 134, at 116.
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demand higher wages, though, even assuming that such increases
would make a difference from a local perspective, it is worth noting
that this outcome is far from clear. More likely, continued local
efforts at line-drawing-not unlike that which local immigration
regulations sought to accomplish-would continue, albeit with a new
target population.
The above is by no means an exhaustive survey of all the ways
that comprehensive immigration reform would or would not affect
the local communities using or tempted by local immigration
regulations. There are no doubt many different ways of imagining
federal reform that may offer consolation to local communities. 03
Nevertheless, to the extent that the issues surrounding local
immigration regulations are not synonymous with those surrounding
the national immigration debates, we should be cautious of the
promise and potential of comprehensive immigration reform in the
local context. At best, comprehensive reform would translate the
impulses behind local immigration regulations into more traditional
local regulations. For some, this technical reclassification may be
sufficient to declare an immigration crisis averted. But to the extent
that the so-called crisis is not understood as local involvement in the
federal arena of immigration, but substantively as a local attempt to
respond to local pressures, it is not clear that comprehensive reform is
the fabled silver bullet that so many seem to believe it to be.
C.

The Promiseof Local Legal Reforms

If local responses to immigration are due in large part to the
influence of local legal structures, then it could be that focusing on
these legal structures directly might be as effective a reform strategy
as those that usually arise in the immigration discourse. For those
interested in local involvement in immigration, it might be worthwhile
to consider the ways in which local legal structures can be altered to
enable and incentivize local communities to, for example, pursue
inclusionary or integrationist approaches rather than exclusionary
203. The best balance that I can imagine from a local perspective is if strict
enforcement is coupled with a multi-year temporary worker program that allows for the
recruitment of foreign labor without incurring the corresponding costs associated with
children or family. But even then it is important to acknowledge the negative
consequences endemic to maintaining a large population of transient workers with no
bonds or investment in the community within which they work. See Griffith, supra note
135, at 52 (noting that, while North Carolina uses H-2A to recruit legal guest-workers, it is
the state's undocumented immigrants "that ha[ve] been more apt than the H-2 program to
generate family ties to towns, neighborhoods, schools, and other social resources of North
Carolina... that we normally associate with the development of community").
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strategies. For those concerned about the impact of immigration on
local communities, or the pressures that have led immigration to rely
on local immigration regulations, then local legal reform might offer
more possibilities for relief and avenues for proactive responses than
adjustments to our immigration criteria or quotas.
Immigration commentators and reformers interested in exploring
these possibilities should not feel that they would have to carve out
this path themselves. Rather, they will likely find the prolific body of
local government scholarship useful in this endeavor. Indeed, it is
even possible that new cooperative opportunities might emerge as a
result. For example, immigration reformers interested in addressing
the plight of immigrant residents in American society may find their
endeavors strengthened by alliances with anti-segregation activists or
smart growth proponents.2°4 Similarly, immigration reformers
concerned about the tremendous pressures that immigration often
imposes on communities might find their options expanded by
working with regionalists or proponents of inter-local revenue
sharing.2"5
Although now uncommon, it is important to realize that
approaching the issue of immigration with an eye toward local legal
and political structures is not new. Indeed, it can be argued that it
was only in the last couple of decades that immigration has come to
stand as an issue apart from local or municipal affairs. At the turn of
the twentieth century, before the dominance of comprehensive and
all-pervasive immigration regimes, the conversation surrounding
immigration was intimately connected and intertwined with those
concerning municipal reform and the legal structure of localism." 6
Because immigration was understood by many to be as much a local
as a national problem, immigration restrictions were often
understood to be but one of many options for dealing with
immigration. We may question the substance of the proposals that

204. For an overview of the smart growth movement, see generally ANDRES DUANY
ET AL., SMART GROWTH: NEW URBANISM IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2003).

205. For descriptions and critiques of the regionalism movement, see generally Gerald
E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002); DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); Briffault, supranote 36.

206. Of course, most of these accounts took an unfavorable view of immigrants and
municipal affairs. See, e.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS

141 (1963) (noting that, in cities like Boston, "many leaders of [municipal] reform were
leaders of the Immigration Restriction League"); JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE
TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920, at 155 (2d ed.
2000).
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were in vogue around that time. Nevertheless, it is an approach that
may be worth resurrecting.
Admittedly, the localist approach has limitations.
The
immigration-related issues that it can address are partial, and there is
no guarantee that local legal reforms will necessarily lead to the kind
of local action that we wish to produce. But there is already some
evidence that local legal structures make a difference. The way in
which North Carolina relies on regional school districts funded in
large part through state funds collected from across the state, or its
decision to maintain a liberal annexation policy that reduces
urban/suburban competition and encourages municipal/county
cooperation, 207 may seem at first to be of limited concern to those
involved with the issue of immigration. But it can be argued that, by
reducing inter-local competition and encouraging a more expansive
regional outlook, this structure seems to have opened up a space
where meaningful local approaches to immigration have an
opportunity to develop.
It is too early to predict what a localist approach to immigration
will offer. Nevertheless, whatever immigration localism is or comes
to be, it is certainly an approach worth exploring.
CONCLUSION

Writing about Boston in the late nineteenth century, Frederick
Bush6e remarked: "The problem at the North End [the city's foreign
district] is the problem of immigration, to be solved at the ports of the
United States. The problem at the South End is the internal social
problem., 20 8 More than a century has passed since that comment was
made.
Nevertheless, its underlying assumption-that our local
immigration problems and our local domestic problems are distinct
and incomparable-has come to dominate the local and national
discourse on immigration in this country.
It is time to reconsider this assumption.
As this Article
demonstrates, the issue of immigration and the consequences of
localism are often intertwined. Focusing on the recent and varied
local responses to immigration, we have seen how local immigration
regulations cannot be understood entirely from the conventional
federal- and immigration-oriented perspectives. Starting with the
207. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 190, 192, 234-36 (2001).
208. Frederick Bush6e, Population, in THE CITY WILDERNESS:
STUDY 33, 39 (Robert A. Woods ed., 1898).
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proposition that local immigration regulations may not have that
much to do with immigration at all, this Article has sought to reveal
how local responses can be understood to be a consequence of how
local legal structures empower and disempower localities, and how
localism creates incentives and disincentives for certain conduct.
Localism as both a doctrinal and conceptual framework complicates
how local immigration regulations, and the federal-local relationship,
are understood. And as the close reexamination of the local response
to immigration in North Carolina uncovered, local legal structures not
only offer some explanation for why certain communities have relied
on local immigration regulations, but also suggest possibilities for why
others have not.
All this suggests that local immigration regulations cannot be
understood from the perspective of immigration law alone; nor is
federalism itself, despite its important insights, sufficient as an
alternative. By establishing the rule and incentive structure within
which local action is invariably situated, localism has a considerable
influence as well. Of course, to the extent that the controversy
surrounding local immigration regulations is increasingly becoming a
popular framework for understanding the issue of immigration more
generally, it may be that considerations of localism should be
extended even more broadly than they are here. At the very least, we
would do well not to overlook the legal consequence of the local in
our assessment of local immigration regulations.

